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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to examine the extent of the role that the Industrial Technology Research
Institute (ITRI) played in Taiwan's high-technological development and whether developing
countries of today can promote such development by creating similar institutional
arrangements.
Literature on innovation systems was reviewed, particularly national innovation systems and
the role of R&D institutions within these. Taiwan's recent economic success, deemed
attributable to economic and institutional reforms in recent decades, was also studied. In
depth analysis was carried out of its leading high-technological research institute, ITRI, which
bridges the gap between industry and academia. Although the case of Taiwan is sometimes
presented as a unique example of industrial success of an SME-based state, this thesis argues
that this success was possible because the research and development process had a large
institute at its core. One way of creating such a research scale is by merging existing
institutes, a process that would result in more efficient use of capital and human resources.
The case of high-technological development in Pakistan is briefly assessed in order to gauge
how its existing institutions structure could be amended to allow such changes to be made.
The study concludes with the following three main points: (i) scale is an important factor:
Taiwan's SME-based industry was able to succeed because of a large research institute at its
core; (ii) in developing countries, governments decide which form of high-technology to
pursue and when; thus, timing and choice of sector are important; and (iii) political leadership
was seen to be important in the case of Taiwan's development in high-technology, and can
play a key role in developing countries of today.
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CD-ROM compact disk read-only memory
CEPED Council for Economic Planning and Development (Taiwan)
CIM computer-integrated manufacturing
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SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises
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TFT thin film transistor
TNC transnational corporation
VLSI very large-scale integration
1 INTRODUCTION
Purpose of Study
This thesis seeks to examine the impact that large, government-supported research
institutions can have on the development of high-technology industry in developing
countries. Its recommendations are based on lessons learnt from Taiwan's
experience with the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI).
The goal of the thesis was to study the key elements that contributed to Taiwan's
success with ITRI in order to make recommendations regarding institutional set-up
for developing countries to promote high-tech industrial development. The role of
the institute in promoting scientific and technological development has been given
much emphasis in literature on innovation systems. This thesis asserts that within a
national innovation system comprised of several institutions working together, it is
important for one large institute to take the leading role and coordinate the activities
of the other actors of the system, thereby strengthening the research and technical
skills at a national level, and contributing to economic development. ITRI is
examined from this angle; was it the leading institution where Taiwan's development
is concerned? How do such institutes contribute both directly and indirectly to
promote industrial development? Finally, can this model of a leading-institute-based
national innovation system be applied to developing countries of today to help them
develop technologically?
Background
The Rise of Taiwan
Taiwan was a poor developing country in the 1 950s. In recent decades, however,
it has witnessed spectacular economic growth, and is now one of the world
leaders in the production and design of high-technology.1  Many analysts
1 According to Jacobsen (2000), the label of 'high technology' is applied to "those industries in which
"'product development involves large development costs, long lead times, and considerable technological
uncertainty"', relying on "'knowledge that is close to the frontiers of present-day scientific research'.
These industries include computers, robotics, fiber optics, genetic engineering, aerospace, artificial
intelligence, and telecommunications." Pp. 43-44.
attribute Taiwan's success to the economic reforms it put in place, which have
focused on import substitution2 and export promotion. However, some have
identified the establishment of key state-partnered institutions as a factor as
important as the economic reforms. 3 The roles played by these institutions, and
their interactions with other institutions, it has been claimed, have had a large
effect on promoting technological research and diffusing knowledge within the
state. An 'innovation system' was created that, in its initial stages, helped
Taiwan's manufacturers imitate the production of technology of industrialized
countries. Eventually, the system moved from imitation to advanced research and
development, with Taiwan becoming a leading supplier of semiconductors,
consumer electronics and computers to foreign companies. Today, Taiwan's
focus is innovation - i.e., breaking new grounds in cutting-edge technology,
such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, and opto-electronics.
The Impact of ITRI
The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was founded in Taiwan in
1973 as a non-profit research institution under the supervision of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs. ITRI has focused on keeping track of and obtaining latest
technology available globally with a view to adapting it to local needs and then
spinning it across Taiwan's industrial sector. ITRI also conducts contract-based
research for the private sector, provides technical training, engages in long-term
research projects for the state, and provides incubation facilities to help
entrepreneurs start up high-tech firms. It currently has eleven labs and research
centers, and over 6,000 personnel.
ITRI has often been credited as a major driver of Taiwan's success in the
production and design of high-tech manufacturing. Apart from conducting
research in its own labs and centers, ITRI has close ties with national universities
and research centers and the large science park based at Hsinchu (many of the
firms located there are graduated of ITRI's incubator). While ITRI is an
autonomous institution, it has been molded by the state: in the 1 970s, the
government decided which technologies ITRI should focus on and how it would
go about developing these; fifty percent of ITRI's funding comes from the state;
and ITRI's operations are influenced by various science plans and
recommendations made by the state. ITRI also works very closely with Taiwan's
2 The process of replacing goods or services produced outside of the country with goods or services
produced within the country. It is designed to enhance the local economy.
3 E.g., Wu and Tseng (1998).
private sector, from where the other half of its funding comes. Taiwan's two
leading semiconductor firms, UMC and TSMC, are both ITRI spin-offs.
ITRI has thus played a pivotal role in bringing the various components of
Taiwan's various development-related institutes together: the state, universities,
research institutes and the private sector.
Research Methodology
In discerning the role that ITRI has played as an institute leading the technological
development and innovation processes in Taiwan, this thesis has relied largely on
extant literature and electronic-interviews. The literature pertains to analysis of
Taiwan's national innovation system, and the role of various organizations within it
in contributing to technological research and development in the country. It also
includes analysis of ITRI as a key factor in the development of Taiwan's high-tech
manufacturing sector and as a central part of Taiwan's innovation system.
The interviews are of figures from various institutional categories. People from
Taiwan were asked to comment on the mechanics of Taiwan's innovation system, as
well as their perception of ITRI's role within it. The people from Pakistan were
interviewed in order to glean insights into problems facing innovation and research
and development (R&D) in high-tech in developing countries.
Significance of the study
(i) An unprecedented, thorough analysis of the role of ITRI in Taiwan's
development
Few studies have analyzed ITRI comprehensively as a leading factor in high-
tech development in Taiwan. Most have tended to focus on very specific,
relatively narrow aspects of its role. For instance, much has been written on the
role of ITRI in promoting Taiwan's semiconductor industry. Separate studies
have been conducted on links between ITRI and the Hsinchu Science Park, and
on ITRI's incubator. The few comprehensive studies that have been carried out
are in Chinese. This thesis undertakes the task of compiling existing
information on ITRI from a wide range of angles, as well as the opinions of
experts, to assess the leadership role ITRI has played in Taiwan's development.
(ii) To suggest a lead-institute model of development for developing countries
This thesis tentatively explores whether technological development in
developing countries can be spurred by establishing large-scale government-
supported research and development institutions. While the question is not
addressed at length in this thesis, the document lays out the theoretical
background for further exploration of this issue.
The need to focus on technological development in developing countries is
crucial; according to Sachs (2002, p. v) it is new advances in science and
technology that are required "to address the interlocking crises of public
health, agricultural productivity, environmental degradation and demographic
stress confronting the poorest developing countries". Science and technology,
in turn, are best advanced through a smoothly working national innovation
system, as will be discussed in the following chapter. Thus the issue of
developing appropriate innovation systems is of crucial importance within
developing countries.
Thesis organization
The next chapter examines concepts of innovation and how they relate to
technological change. It will also look at prevailing views on the innovation systems
approach as laid out in the literature. Lastly, it explores the characteristics of
national innovation systems, with a focus on developing countries.
Chapter 3 focuses on Taiwan. It looks at Taiwan's economic growth over the past
four decades, its success in the manufacturing and electronics industries, and at the
factors that brought these about. The latter half of the chapter looks at Taiwan's
national innovation system: the key actors and the relationships between them.
Chapter 4 looks exclusively at ITRI's history, research areas, structure and functions.
Chapter 5 looks more closely at ITRI's role within Taiwan's innovation system. It then
looks upon the findings thus far in the light of their applicability to developing
countries, briefly examining the case of Pakistan.
Chapter 6 presents some conclusions that can be drawn from the study.
Main findings
This thesis concluded that ITRI played a lead-institute role in Taiwan's high
technological industrial development, and that the creation of such a large-scale
research institute linking industry to academia was necessary given Taiwan's reliance
on small and medium enterprises.
On the basis of Taiwan's experience, the study concludes that developing countries
can benefit much from an ITRI-approach towards high tech development, by
consolidating research institutes in order to create the scale necessary for effective
research and technology adaptation. The feasibility of doing this in Pakistan was
briefly studied.
For developing countries, government interventions are a key part of the
development process. Regarding government intervention in high-tech
development, key lessons that can be drawn are: choice of sector and timing are
important. Political leadership, too, plays a crucial role.
2 INNOVATION SYSTEMS & INSTITUTIONS
REVIEWING THE LITERATURE
Just as energy is the basis of life itself, and ideas the source of
innovation, so is innovation the vital spark of all human change,
improvement and progress.
Theodore Levitt
Introduction
This chapter examines the concept of innovation as integral to development. It
explains what is meant by 'innovation' and the prerequisites generally thought
necessary for innovation to occur. It discusses the concept of innovation systems, as
well as various opinions on the boundaries and workings of national innovation
systems. The role of the institution within innovation systems is of particular interest
throughout the chapter. It concludes with an examination of whether the usual
approach towards national innovation systems holds for industrialized and
developing economies alike, and briefly discusses the severe need for technological
innovation in developing countries. The chapter sets a theoretical background for
the remainder of the thesis, which looks in more practical terms at how innovation
can be facilitated in developing countries.
Innovation and Technological Change
While classical economists such as Ricardo and Marx were aware of the
microeconomic processes involved in the adoption of innovations4, innovation
theory really took off during the 1 980s, and is therefore a relatively recent branch of
knowledge. Although much has been written on the subject since then, no
universally accepted definition of innovation seems to exist. Within innovation
literature today, the definition ranges from being synonymous with technological
development to the process of making any new discovery. Definitions depend upon
the type of economy under consideration; innovation takes on different meanings
for developing economies than for industrialized economies.
4 See Cooper (1994), pp. 2-3. These microeconomic processes are referred to as "Schumpeterian", after
the economist Joseph A. Schumpeter.
Given that definitions of innovation have arisen in the context of current global
trends and processes, there is a strong emphasis on technology. As Sachs and
McArthur (2002, p. 157) state:
We are living in an age of remarkable technological change that is forcing us to think
very hard about the linkages between technology and economic development. The
harder we think about it, the more we realize that technological innovation is almost
certainly the key driver of economic growth.
Van Dijk and Sandee (2002) have gone a step further, claiming that innovation is
"virtually synonymous with technological change" (p. 1). However, this definition is
context-specific; they found that African case studies yielded a broader definition of
innovation that would encompass the following processes: using different raw
materials or economizing on the use of raw materials or energy; improving the
design or introducing a new way to finance, distribute or stock products; and
changing the management of a small business. Thus for Africa they claim that the
"making a different product or a product of slightly better quality" (p. 4) could be
considered innovation, since this would involve the first practical use of a new, more
productive technique.
This view, of linking the definition of innovation to knowledge that leads to
something new or different, has also been espoused by others. Afuah (1998)5, for
instance, states that innovation is "the use of new knowledge to offer a new product
or service that customers want". This stipulation of the product being desirable or
useful is considered necessary to the definition of innovation. According to Porter
(1990)6, innovation "is a new way of doing things that is commercialized [ital. mine].
The process of innovation cannot be separated from a firm's strategic and
competitive context". These definitions are in accord with the view of innovation as
technological change only when such change results, according to Cooper (1994), in
a general increase in surplus value, which may be identified as profits. Therefore,
innovation includes a range of activities in addition to science and technology:
organization, finance, and commerce (Shyu and Chiu, 2002).
Van Dijk and Sandee (2002), among several others, have clarified that there is a
difference between product and process innovation - a distinction that is made clear
through Edquist's (2001) diagram (Figure 2.1) below.
5 in Shyu and Chiu (2002), p. 370.
6 In Shyu and Chiu (2002), p. 370.
Figure 2.1 A Taxonomy of Innovation
Source: Edquist (2001)
Why study innovation?
Innovation results in technological advance, which has tremendous impact on
economic growth. Solow 7 conducted a study of the US economy over 1909-1949,
which he published in 1957. He found that technological change accounted for
seven eighths of the growth of the economy over this period, and that increases in
capital stock - the equipment, machinery, and residential stock relative to the
population - accounted for only one eighth of the growth of income per person in
the United States.
In depicting what can happen in the absence of technological innovation, Sachs and
McArthur (2002) give examples of the stagnation that occurred in the Soviet Union
and many South American economies. Countries can avoid this, they maintain, by
continually advancing their technological capacity. Doing this in a systematic manner
would require understanding the processes of developing and applying new ideas in
production, i.e., a study of innovation processes.
Edquist (2001) presents a compelling rationale for the formal study of innovation
systems:
... knowledge in the form of human capital and structural capital become more
important than physical capital (machinery and buildings). This would then imply that
the economy operates in a completely different way. This should be reflected in our
approaches. (p. 17).
7In Sachs and MacArthur (2002).
The 'systems of innovation (SI)' approach
Definition of innovation system
Edquist (2001) states that in order for a system to be termed as such, it must
have components with relationships between them. Carlsson et a. (2002) also
include attributes - the properties of the components and the relationships
between them - in the definition of a system. Further, a system should have
identifiable boundaries. However, it will be seen later that in the case of
innovation systems determination of the boundaries is often difficult and
depends on the level of analysis of the system.
The concept of national innovation systems was introduced in the mid-1980s
by scholars who were dissatisfied with the neo-classical treatment of
innovation as an exogenous variable and, drawing from the field of
evolutionary economics, stressed the endogenous nature of innovation in its
own development (Keller and Samuels, 2003). The systems of innovation (SI)
approach was pioneered by Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992) and Nelson
(1993) and became established in a very short period of time (Edquist, 2001). It
has been defined by Edquist (1997, p. 14) as: "all important economic, social,
and other factors that influence the development of innovations". More specific
regarding the types of innovation, Freeman (1987) defines an innovation
system as "the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new
technologies" (p. 1).
It should be noted that the innovation systems approach examines the
determinants of innovation, not its consequences (Edquist, 2001).
The need for a systems approach to innovation
While the results of innovation may be visible at the firm level, it is not a purely
market-driven phenomenon. The process must be supported by a complex set
of social institutions, both market and non-market (Sachs and McArthur,
2002). Thus in order for governments to foster innovative economic systems,
they need to analyze the interconnected set of institutions that guarantee
effective innovation (ibid.). The innovation systems approach attempts to
identify the key actors involved and the relationships between them, and is
therefore necessary in the formulation of any innovation strategy.
Characteristics of innovation systems
An important concept of the innovation systems approach is that learning is
interactive between organizations; firms do not innovate in isolation (Edquist,
1997). This idea of the firm as a leading organization embedded within a
broader institutional context has also been presented by Mytelka (1998) and by
Shyu and Chiu (2002), who state that innovation is not the product of the
atomistic behavior of maximizing agents, but is the result of particular
dynamics determined at various levels. This view perceives competitiveness as
the outcome of a continuous process of innovation that enables firms to catch
up and to keep up as technology and the mode of competition change
(Mytelka, 1998). Institutions are considered to be crucial elements that shape
(and are shaped by) the actions of the organizations and the relations between
them (Edquist 1997).
Edquist (2001) points out that all studies on the SI approach consider
innovation processes to be evolutionary. This ties into the idea of
cumulativeness of knowledge, another important concept of the SI approach.
Current technologies and production at the firm level influence the learning
processes and the nature of accumulated experience (van Dijk and Sandee,
2002). This has also been mentioned by Cooper (1994).
Sachs and MacArthur (2002) have identified the following characteristics of the
innovation process that relate to the system as a whole:
1. Innovation is science-based, which implies a great deal of importance for
higher education as a fundamental feature of innovation strategy. (Lall (2000)
has also pointed out the highly technology-specific nature of innovation in
firms).
2. It is an increasing-returns-to-scale process, which explains why scientists
congregate at places like Silicon Valley and Route 128. Creating an innovation
system requires creating scale. (The importance of innovation 'clusters' has
also been emphasized by van Dijk and Sandee (2002) in discussing studies on
SME innovation, and by Steinle and Schiele (2002)).
3. Innovation depends on market-based incentives, and on the scope of the
market itself.
4. There is a fundamentally mixed public and private good nature to the
innovation process. Society benefits through the widespread diffusion of
(scientific) ideas.
5. Special funding mechanisms beyond the banking sector help to accommodate
knowledge creation in the private sector. Innovation requires venture
capitalists.
6. Innovation generates destruction of older technologies and business sectors
in a process of "creative destruction". (This ties in to the "evolutionary" aspect
of innovation mentioned by Edquist (2001).)
7. The innovation process is characterized by specific forms of organization that
develop, test, and prove ideas. Innovation first requires networks to bring
different kinds of knowledge together.
8. Many technologies exhibit characteristics of site-specifity; not all
technologies can be imported from abroad since they may not all be
necessarily relevant to the adopter's needs.
Lall (2000) adds the following points to the characteristics of innovation. These
relate to the way the system functions:
1. Firms function with imperfect, variable, and rather hazy knowledge of
technologies they are using.
2. Learning itself often has to be learned (Stiglitz, 1987). In a developing
country, knowledge of traditional, stable, and simple technologies may be not
be a good base on which to learn how to master modern technologies.
3. Different technologies can also have different degrees of dependence on
interactions with outside sources of knowledge or information, such as other
firms, consultants, capital goods supplies, or technology institutions. It is
important to remember these differences in technology-specific features,
which determine learning costs, risks, duration, and linkages, in considering
how capabilities an be promoted by policy.
4. Capacity-building involves effort at all levels - shop floor, process and
product engineering, quality management, maintenance, procurement,
inventory control, outbound logistics, and relations with other firms and
institutions. Innovation, in the conventional sense of formal research and
development activity leading to new products or processes, is at one end of
the spectrum of technological activity; it does not exhaust it.
5. Technological development can take place within a given learning process to
different depths. The attainment of a minimum level of operational capability
(know-how) is essential to all industrial activity. While difficult to acquire,
depending on the technology and initial stock of capabilities, this may not
lead automatically to the ability to understand the principles of the
technology (know-why).
6. The development of know-why is an important part of overall learning. It
allows enterprises to select more efficiently what new technologies they need,
lower the costs of buying these technologies, adapt and improve on them
more effectively, add more value by using their own knowledge in production,
and develop autonomous innovative capabilities.
7. Technological learning in a form does not take place in isolation; the process
is rife with externalities and interlinkages.
In his critique on the systems approach to innovation, Edquist (2001) gives
various reasons why he believes it cannot be termed a "theory", as is
sometimes done. Firstly, he points to the fact that the term "institution" has
often been used inconsistently among various authors, i.e., both in the sense
of organizational actors (or players) and in the sense of institutional rules (or
rules of the game). Aslo, studies on innovation systems are weakened by the
fact that very little is known about their determinants. Further, the SI approach
partly neglects other kinds of learning processes than those that lead to
innovations in a direct and immediate way. This issue was addressed by
Lundvall (1 992)8 when he pointed out a "broad" versus "narrow" approach to
innovation. Edquist (2001) also claims that the SI approach largely neglects
individual learning in the form of education, and that it lacks a "theoretical"
component about the role of the state. This last flaw, he claims, is an
important neglect, since the state and its agencies are obviously important
determinants of innovation in any SI.
Stages of innovation
Van Dijk and Sandee (2002) have identified four stages of technological
change: the introduction of new technology, the imitation of technology,
adaptation of the technology to local circumstances, and further development
of the technology by local producers.
8 In Freeman (2002).
Most of the procedures above relate to technology adoption, rather than an
actual innovative process. Thus there are two basic modes of advancing
technology (Sachs and McArthur, 2002): innovation (developing one's own new
technologies) and adoption (introducing technologies that have been devised
elsewhere) 9. All economies pursue both to an extent. Adopting technology
from abroad may raise living standards substantially, and even achieve long-
term growth based on continuing technological innovations abroad. However,
such an approach also has its limitations; economic theory demonstrates that if
one economy is a technological innovator while another economy is a
technology adopter, the innovator will maintain a lead in income per capita
relative to the adopter. Further, this income gap between the two economies
will persist over time even if the technology adopter ends up incorporating all
of the technological advances made by the innovator. The gap in "catch up"
between the innovator and the adopter depends on the relative rates of
innovation and diffusion of technology. Thus, conclude Sachs and MacArthur
(2002), there are two important lessons: (i) a follower economy that adopts
technology from abroad but does not innovate will always lag behind the
innovator, and (ii) even technological adoption requires specialized institutions
that facilitate the diffusion of new technologies.
With regard to the second lesson, Lall (2000) has claimed that "follower"
strategies also require a certain degree of advanced knowledge; "'know-why''
and not merely "know-how" capabilities. Technology import, he continues, is
not a substitute for indigenous capability development; the efficacy with which
imported technologies are used depends on local efforts.
Levels of analysis
Innovation systems can be defined in geographical (national, regional or
global) or sectoral terms. Often, defining the system boundaries is not a clear-
cut procedure. Edquist (2001) claims that if the determinants of innovations'
development, diffusion and use are known, it should be possible to define the
functional boundaries of the system. However, identification of the
determinants, although very important, is not an easy task (ibid.). Van Dijk
(2002), however, has suggested that the actors in innovation may be part of a
network that does not have a boundary, but rather, a focus. Freeman (2001)
has presented a detailed analysis of innovation systems on a national and
regional scale.
9 The discussion in this paragraph is based on Sachs and MacArthur (2002).
Keller and Samuels (2003) discuss the sectoral perspective. They claim that this
is similar to the geographical approach in that the sectoral innovation system
comprises similar relationships and institutions. However, these interact within
a functionally delimited domain, which may be nationally, regionally, or
globally distributed. In this view, therefore, firms in the same business - even if
in different countries - have more in common with one another (and organize
their R&D in the same ways) than do firms in different sectors in the same
country (ibid.). Aerospace industries in Russia, Japan, and Indonesia - like
computer industries in Korea, Taiwan, and India - have more in common with
one another than do aerospace firms and computer firms in any one of these
states (ibid.).
Whether a geographical or sectoral level is under consideration, the system can
further be studied at three levels of analysis, as identified by van Dijk and
Sandee (2002):
1. The macro- or policy-level, promoting (or discouraging) innovation and
innovation diffusion;
2. The meso-level or the level of business support systems and how technological
development and innovation are influenced at that level;
3. The level of the enterprise or a cluster of enterprises where the actual
development and diffusion will take place.
Determinants of innovation within the system
Identification of the determinants of innovation has already been
acknowledged as a difficult task. However, Lall (2000) suggests that the
determinants reside within a framework that can be classified into incentives,
factor markets, and institutions:
Incentives: these arise from the macroeconomic environment, trade policy,
domestic industrial policies, and domestic demand.
Factor Markets: the most important factor markets in technology development are
skills (especially technical skills), finance for technological activities, and access to
information, domestic and foreign.
Institutions: here these refer to bodies that support industrial technology, such as
education and training, standards, metrology, technical extension, R&D, long-term
credit, technology and export information, and so on. These institutions may be
government run, started by the government but run autonomously, or started and
managed by industry associations or private interests.
Related to the "factor markets" category, van Dijk and Sandee (2002) introduce
the "flexible specialization" concept for fostering development in small firms,
in which he identifies the innovative mentality of the entrepreneur and the skill
level of the workers as important factors in the competitiveness of small and
medium enterprises. This view stresses the importance of factors like clusters
and networks. The idea that innovation can take place more easily in networks
and clusters has also been endorsed by (Steinle and Schiele, 2002).
Edquist (2001) has pointed out that sometimes the determinants of innovation
systems can also be identified as being the 'specific functions' of the system,
e.g., in the production of economically relevant knowledge through R&D or the
financing of the development of innovations. Liu and White (2001) have also
acknowledged this "lack of system-level explanatory factors" (p. 4). They have
focused upon the 'activities' in the systems, which are related to "the creation,
diffusion and exploitation of technological innovation within a system" (p. 6).
National Innovation Systems
A national innovation system, according to Keller and Samuels, comprises firms,
universities, non-profit entities, and public agencies that produce or support the
production of science and technology within national borders. This approach was
originally put forward by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993). Lall (2000) has put
forward a similar national systems approach that examines technological activity.
Although its definition' 0 does not immediately set it apart from the national
innovation systems approach, Lall (2000) claims that it differs somewhat from the
latter in that it places more emphasis on the incentive regime, particularly trade
policies. Lall's (2000) approach also introduces market failure considerations to
mediate between firm- and country-level capabilities. This, he claims, provides a
more coherent and systematic structure to the analysis of national systems.
One issue that has repeatedly been brought up in the literature is the relevance of
national boundaries to national innovation systems. Lall (2000) claims that despite
technological activities being strongly conditioned by activity in other countries,
10 Lail (2000) defines national technological capability as "the complex of skills, experience and effort that
enables a country's enterprises to efficiently buy, adapt, improve and create technologies" (p. 14).
national abilities are becoming increasingly important, particularly in developing
countries. Keller and Samuels (2003) also believe that national boundaries are
important. They claim that innovation systems that span sectors in the same country
have more in common with each other than they do with the same industrial sector
in other countries.
Edquist (2001), however, claims that if the degree of coherence or inward orientation
is very low, it is not meaningful to consider the country to have a national system of
innovation. Nelson and Rosenberg (1993)" also believe the concept may be too
broad, and favor a sectoral approach towards innovation systems instead. While
Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1995)12 concede that sometimes the nation-state
constitutes the natural boundary of many technological systems, they add that at
other times it may make sense to talk about a regional or local technological system.
Freeman (2002) also claims that many authors have argued that globalization has
greatly diminished or even eliminated the importance of the nation-state. Carlsson
et al (2002), for instance, claim that vast improvements in communication
technology in recent decades have lent an international dimension to almost any
economic activity. Alternatively, some critics stress that sub-national entities, such
as provinces, industrial districts, cities or 'Silicon Valleys' are becoming, or have
already become, more important than the nation-state (in Freeman, 2002).
Lall (2000) claims that the development of capacity at the national level shares many
features of learning at the enterprise level, in that countries undergo costly,
uncertain, prolonged and unpredictable learning. Other characteristics of national
learning he identifies are: the fact that it is path-dependent, patterns of
specialization are difficult to change quickly, and the national base of capabilities
determines how well countries are able to cope with new technologies. Growing
national technical maturity, Lall (2000) claims, involves the industrial sector's ability
to move from easy to complex technologies, and from know-how to know-why.
Freeman (2002) identifies institutional flexibility as an important aspect of national
innovation systems. In his analysis of the large divergence in economic growth rates
over the world in the past two centuries, he attributes these "in large measure to the
presence or absence of social capability for institutional change, and especially for
those types of institutional change which facilitate and stimulate a high rate of
technical change, i.e., innovation systems" (p.192). Growth in British industrial
districts in the eighteenth century was possible because of the presence of local
institutions and national benefits conferred through British political, cultural,
11 In Edquist (2001).
12 in Edquist (2001).
economic and technological institutions (ibid.). Edquist (1997) claims that British
economic slow-down over the twentieth century was due to the relative rigidity of
organizational structures compared with informal institutions.
Since national innovation systems rely on several factors that the state must take an
active role in - such as stimulating basic science as a public good, or public action
that influences innovations from the demand side (Edquist, 2001), a fundamental
question that arises is "what should be performed by the public sector and what
should not" (ibid., p. 18). Edquist justifies state intervention in two instances: firstly,
if market mechanisms fail to achieve the objectives formulated, and secondly, if the
state and its public agencies have the ability to solve or mitigate the problem.
The role of the institution in innovation systems
Much has already been said in preceding sections about the role that institutions can
play in developing and diffusing technology. However, discussion on institutions has
thus far tended to be in very broad terms. This section looks at some of the
institution-specific discussion on innovation systems.
As regards definition, Edquist and Johnson (1997) have explained that 'institution'
tends to hold a dual meaning in innovation literature. The first refers to
'organizations', where organizations "are formal structures with an explicit purpose
and they are consciously created" (p. 47). Important instances of organizations
would be companies, universities, venture capital organizations and public
innovation policy agencies. Secondly, institutions may be taken to mean "sets of
common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the
relations and interactions between individuals, groups and organizations" (ibid., p.
46). Examples here would be patent laws and norms influencing the relations
between universities and firms (ibid.). Edquist (2001) claims that the relationships
between organizations and institutions (norms) are important for innovation and the
operation of its systems, and each may be said to be 'embedded' in the other. Some
organizations directly create institutions (and institutions may also be the basis for
the creation of organizations; ibid.). There may also be important interactions
between institutions. Thus the relationships between organizations and institutions
are complex, characterized by reciprocity, and may support and reinforce each other
(they may also contradict and be in conflict with each other; ibid.).
Whitley (2002) has referred to studies that have contrasted the technological and
sectoral specializations of Germany, the United States, and some other countries in
the past few decades. These studies have highlighted how differences in welfare
systems, employment law and conventions, the organization of business
associations, training systems, financial markets, and legal systems generate
different incentives for individuals and firms to pursue distinctive innovation
strategies. These institutional variations, it is claimed, not only lead to different rates
of innovation and technical change across industries, but also encourage different
kinds of firms to concentrate on different kinds of innovations within new industries
(Casper, 2000 in Whitley, 2002). The development of differing combinations of
institutional features becoming established in different market economies can,
Whitley (2002) claims, help explain continuing variations in patterns of technological
change between countries. For a detailed discussion on the role of institutions in the
biotechnology and computer industries, see Whitley (2000), particularly for his
discussion on how innovating firms develop distinctive competences.
The institutional dynamic in a country may be crucial for the resilience of its
economy. Keller and Samuels (2003) state: "the elements of institutional
configuration of a political economy - its regulatory structure, the organization of
private interests, their relationship to the state, and the location of local firms in the
value-added supply chain - may each be critical in determining its capacity to resist
external shocks" (p. 5). An economy that is less vulnerable is more likely to be
capable of sustained growth.
Thus far the importance of institutions within the innovation system has been
discussed. It is also worthwhile to know where institutions fit into the innovation
system, i.e., how do they, in general terms, link up with industry, the state and
academia? Lin (2003) provides a simple model (Figs. 2.2 (a) and (b)) to show the key
functions of institutions within a national innovation system. Thus the model shows
that they provide the key link between academia and industry in the development of
technological products. It should be noted that the services provided by the
government in this model are also "institutional", but perhaps not as directly
technology-related as the others.
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Innovation in Developing Countries
The need for technological development
Developments in science and technology can provide solutions to the problems
facing the world's poorest developing countries (Sachs, 2002). To name just a
few, these countries are facing problems in agriculture, environmental
degradation, health and energy supplies. The developing world is aware that it is
lagging behind, and catching up is viewed as a priority by most developing-
country governments. The Group of 77 (G77), a negotiating bloc of developing
countries, recently expressed "deep concern" over the prevailing and growing
knowledge gap between the North and the South, and affirmed its commitment
to "the promotion and development of knowledge and technology in the
South"] 3. Developing countries have also consistently pushed hard for Northern
countries to commit to technology transfer in international treaties and
protocols.
The first reason, then, that developing countries would be interested in
technology growth is to reduce the direct effects of poverty on their people. This
can be done through improved medical facilities, better agricultural equipment
and irrigation methods, better shelter and infrastructure, and reduction of urban
pollution.
A second reason would be to boost their economies by improving industrial
production. Choi (1986) claims that a three-way relationship exists between
science and technology, industrial development, and economic growth of a
nation: "...advances in science and technology give rise to new knowledge, new
products, new processes. These innovations spawn new industries which yield
economic gains and also lead the economy into new directions" (p. 2).
The third reason pertains to the need for developing countries to bridge the
widening knowledge gap between themselves and developed countries. Lall
(2000) claims that in today's globalizing world, it becomes even more important
for developing countries to deepen their technological base. Since international
competitiveness has become the prime consideration in attracting new, high
value-added foreign direct investment, developing countries must offer
production sites that have not just low wages, but world-class technical and
managerial skills (ibid.). To upgrade these, and to attract new, higher value-
added activities, they must provide a growing base of advanced manufacturing
13 In its 'Dubai Declaration for the Promotion of Science and Technology in the South', April 2000.
and design skills and flexible and specialized supplier and support networks.
Furthermore, to capture some of the externalities generated by technologically
advanced MNCs, domestic firms must be able to learn from them. Further,
building these capabilities will help developing countries decide which
technologies will best address local needs and how they can be adapted to do so.
The mere transfer of technology from the North, particularly by multinational
corporations, is seen as a sub-optimal strategy that does not necessarily address
local needs or help build capacity in developing countries (Buatsi, 1988).
The process of technological change
The process of technological change in developing countries is one of acquiring
and improving on technological capabilities rather than of innovating on all
frontiers of knowledge (Lall, 2000). Developing countries obtain their industrial
technologies mainly from the industrialized world, and their main technological
challenge, at least initially, is to master, adapt, and improve on the imported
knowledge and equipment (ibid.). The need for local learning exists even if the
seller of the technology provides advice and assistance. Technological learning
calls for conscious, purposive, and incremental efforts - to collect new
information, try things out, create new skills and operational routines, and strike
new external relationships (ibid)
The N/S approach and developing countries
Recently, analysts such as Cooper (1994) have posed the question of whether
studies using an innovation systems approach in industrialized countries can
offer insights into innovation processes in developing countries; thus far, both
sets of studies have been carried out in isolation.
Viotti (2001) states that studies that have used the national innovation systems
approach on industrializing economies seem to have accomplished little, and
that this has not been due to lack of available data. The problem, Viotti claims,
lies in the NIS approach itself; the theoretical and conceptual framework is not
appropriate for dealing with the processes of technical change typical of
industrializing countries, which are extremely different from those of
industrialized countries. The NIS approach provides a framework for analysis of
technical change at the level of national economies, and most NIS studies -
whether on industrial or developing economies - have focused primarily on
scientific and technological activities aimed at innovation (as admitted by Nelson
(1993), of his 1 5-nation study). Viotti argues that this is opposed to the broader
understanding of NIS, which encompasses institutions that directly and indirectly
influence the innovation process. While this broader view is required to assess
innovation in industrializing economies, he states, it would still be of little use if
the meaning of innovation is taken to be synonymous with technical change.
The problem, he identifies, is that "the process of technical change characteristic
of these economies is largely shaped outside the realm of those institutions that
are at the core of the innovation process" (p. 2); "innovation has a secondary
role, possibly no role at all, in the process of technical change." (p. 4). Viotti has
instead promulgated his theory of national learning systems for developing
economies, with its emphasis on active and passive learning14. Learning, Viotti
proposes, is the process of technical change achieved by diffusion and
incremental innovation (see Figure 2.3 below).
Fig. 2.3 National Systems of Technical Change
Source: Viotti (2001)
Sachs and McArthur (2002) have stated that, increasingly, the goal is to
understand technological innovation in developing countries as an "endogenous"
feature of the economy, as opposed to something brought in from the outside.
14 According to Viotti (2000), active learning is a consequence of deliberate efforts and investments in
technology, while passive learning requires little or no explicit action; it is a kind of free by-product from
carrying on with production.
The broad aim of such an approach is to understand how a society produces
technological advance.
This view, according to Barbier and Homer-Dixon (1996), points to institutional
and policy failures as the forces that prevent poor countries from generating or
using new technological ideas to reap greater economic opportunities. They
claim, however, that this view omits the important contribution of natural
resource degradation and depletion to institutional instability. "Rather than
generating automatic market and innovation responses, worsening resource
scarcities in poor countries can lead to social conflicts and frictions that disrupt
the institutional and policy environment necessary for successful innovation"
(ibid., p.1). This constraint, they believe, may help explain the disappointing
growth performance of many poor countries.
What is really needed now?
Imitation is generally one of the initial stages of technological change in
developing countries, and a precursor to the adaptation and local assimilation of
technology. These processes were useful in helping Japan, Korea (Choi, 1986)
and Taiwan develop technologically. The need to start with imitation arises partly
because of the limited technical resources of developing countries, and partly
because of their comparatively limited production experience (Cooper, 1994).
The skills required to imitate are a subset of those required for innovation, and
may eventually become a foundation for true innovation (ibid.). However, failure
may occur in the absence of conscious allocation of resources within the firm,
careful organization, or the absence of appropriate external institutional
conditions (ibid.).
Gerschenkon (1962, 1963)1s claimed that latecomer firms have advantages that
were unavailable to the pioneering firms of a technology16. However, his views
have since been challenged by authors who observed differently (e.g., Bell and
Pavit, 1993). Perez and Soete (1988, in Freeman, 2002), in fact, revealed the
disadvantages that latecomers must face; for instance, even imitation may be
costly in the absence of an infrastructure.
i In Freeman (2002).
16 Such as being able to acquire and use latest technology at much lower costs than those in the
pioneering countries; not having to face all the uncertainties, costs and difficulties of opening up entirely
new markets; and being able to move rapidly to large-scale production (ibid.).
STAP (1 996) has noted that today the capacity to replicate is poorly developed in
developing countries, and has identified some of the main reasons for this: (i)
leaders there are rarely interested in nurturing the development of the capacity
to innovate; (ii) even when R&D capacity exists, close involvement of industry is
rare; and (iii) bilateral and multilateral assistance targets only those technologies
that have a proven track record in already industrialized countries (moreover,
they too provide little assistance aimed at nurturing the capacity to innovate).
What needs to be done, given the fact that engineering and management skills
required for innovation are substantial, is to make training an important part of
any technology transfer package, deliberately planned as a learning vehicle for
the work force of the recipient firm (Imai, 1994). The transfer should not only be
of specific know-how, but also of related systemic knowledge of the relevant
technologies so that recipients can add value (STAP, 1996). This is an important
consideration for developing countries, because it implies that the work force
must experience continual cumulative learning, both from experience and formal
training, in order to remain competitive in a world market where intense
continual incremental improvement is increasingly essential to sustained
competitiveness (Brooks, 1995). In those regions of the developing world where
existing capabilities are weak in specific technology areas, basic level of
technological capability should be built via the establishment of regional
institutes that provide training in the fundamentals of technology assessment
and management (STAP, 1996).
Research priorities need to be targeted according to domestic needs; attempting
to follow the development path of the North would be "pursuing the form, rather
than the substance of a successful development strategy" (Swanson, 1999: p.
29). Strategic industries need to be selected based on the country's historical
background, internal and external circumstances, marketing outlook, future
potential, and accumulation of science and technology at the time (Choi, 1986).
All the above recommendations have strong institutional dimensions.
Appropriate organizations and policies will need to be created or re-oriented.
Since, in many developing countries, there is often insufficient participation of
industry in science and development (Choi, 1986), the government may be
required to play a strong role. Creating institutional partnerships, both local and
international, can help industries apply the knowledge domestically (ibid.) and
thus move ahead independently with technology they require. This is crucial for
real development to occur; a permanent situation of simply being "handed over"
technology from the North would mean that they would never be more than
"developing" countries (ibid.). Choi states that research institutions working
independently or in partnership to help local industries implement technology
must fulfill the following important roles:
* take in and ingest the latest high technologies from abroad and transfer them to
domestic industries;
. improve existing technologies and create new ones;
* serve as a channel for introducing new technologies. The institute will locate
well-established and appropriate technologies, and transfer them to industries
where they are needed. It should maintain connections with various research
institutions throughout the world to have at its disposal a wide range of
information - technical, economic and cultural - and comparison of different
alternatives for the appropriate choice of technologies;
* take responsibility for the education of research personnel, in order to utilize
them more effectively;
. have the ability to cope with a diverse range of research problems;
. provide practical and professional experience to scientists and engineers;
* create an atmosphere which is conducive to creative innovative activities.
Sachs and McArthur (2002) agree that being "handed over technology" is not the
long-term solution for developing countries. While the income gap between East
Asia and the US has greatly narrowed, largely due to its formation of indigenous
institutions 17 for quickly adopting technological advances from abroad (ibid.), it
has not closed. It will close, the authors claim, only when East Asia starts to
innovate in its own right.
Conclusions
While much has been written on the concepts of innovation and innovation systems,
there is still lack of consensus on several important issues, ranging from the
definitions of 'innovation' and 'institution' to concerns about how to identify the
determinants and boundaries of the system. Whether the same national innovation
system approach can be applied to both industrialized and developing economies is
also an issue under debate.
It was seen that national innovation systems are highly dependent on institutions
and the relationships between them to function smoothly. In the case of developing
17 These included the creation of special economic zones, export processing zones, science parks, and
other institutional arrangements to entice foreign investments in the electronics sector who were looking
for low-cost places to produce their products (ibid.).
countries, it was noted that building capacity through institutional strengthening is a
vitally important requirement.
The next chapter will build upon the theoretical background presented here, and
examine Taiwan's recent technological success, with particular emphasis on how it
structured various institutions and policies to bolster national technological
development.
3 TAIWAN'S RISE IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY
Chance favors only the prepared mind.
Louis Pasteur
Introduction
This chapter takes a closer look at Taiwan, and is divided into two main parts. The
first is a brief history of Taiwan's spectacular economic and technological climb in
recent decades, highlighting some of the important policy decisions that helped
accomplish this. The second part of the chapter looks closely at Taiwan's innovation
system: how it was built up to be able to support and facilitate Taiwan's
development.
Why focus on Taiwan?
In many developing countries today, a large segment of the population is illiterate,
has limited access to basic resources, and is deprived of the products of global
technological advance (see Table 3.1 for some development indicators in selected
developing countries). A major concern is the widening gap between developing and
industrialized countries. The convergent impacts of globalization, the increasing
importance of knowledge as a main driver of growth, and the information and
communication revolution (World Bank, 2002), are causing developing countries to
feel increasingly left behind. Developing-countrypersons may well ask: is 'catch up'
really possible? After all, it took most industrialized nations 150 years to get where
they are today.
Taiwan's recent history can offer grounds for optimism to the developing world. In a
mere forty years, Taiwan has metamorphosized from a struggling, developing
country into a world leader in the production of high-technology. Often hailed as a
development 'miracle', Taiwan's immense economic and technological success is
generally attributed to a number of macro-economic policies and institutional
reforms carried out over recent decades. These are briefly discussed in the next
sections.
In the 1950s, Taiwan's socio-economic conditions were not very distinguishable
from those of many other developing countries. In 1949, average per capita income
was below US$100, roughly the same as India's (Hobday, 1995). Nearly 35 percent
of the population over age six was illiterate in 1951 (GIO, 2003). The economy was
largely agriculture-based - a hallmark of developing-country economies - and
heavily supported by aid from the United States.
A mere forty years later, Taiwan has emerged as one of the world's leading
producers of high-technology products. Its computer industry has grown to be the
third largest exporter in the world, and its semiconductor-producing industry is the
world's fourth largest (Hsu and Chiang, 2001). In 2001, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office granted 6,550 patents to Taiwan, ranking it fourth in patent
volume worldwide (Wu et al., 2000). Taiwan's per capita GDP was $17,000 in 2001
(CIA, 2003). This wealth is remarkably evenly distributed, with the richest quintile's
income roughly only 5 times that of the poorest quintile (Wu and Tseng, 1998). Over
94 percent of its population is now literate (GIO, 2003). The economy's reliance on
agriculture has fallen steeply; agriculture contributed only two percent to Taiwan's
exports in 2000 (ibid.) while industrial goods accounted for 98.6 percent (EIU,
2001). The biggest category among these was electronics products (21.4 percent in
2000; ibid.).
Table 3.1 Some Development Indicators for Selected Developing Countries
Technology (diffusion and creation)
Country GDP p er Adult Telephone Internet Patents Scientists High-mainlines hosts granted and Technology
capita literacy rate (per 1000 (per to engineers Exports (as %
2000 and above) people) 1000 residents in R&D of
2000 2000 people) (per (per manufactured2000 million million exports)
people) people) 2000*
1999 1999-
2000
Brazil 7,625 85.2 182 5.2 2 168 19 (59)*
Egypt 3,635 55.3 86 (.) (.) 493 (.)b (37b)*
Philippines 3,971 95.3 40 0.3 (.) 156 59 (92)*
India 2,358 57.2 32 (.) 1 158 4b (79b)*
Nicaragua 2,366 66.5 31 0.3 .. 203 5 (8)*
Pakistan 1,928 43.2 22 (.) .. 78 (.) (85)*
Nigeria 896 63.9 4 (.) .. 15 1 3b (*
Chad 871 42.6 1 (.) .. .. ..
Ethiopia 668 39.1 4 (.) .. .. (.) (10)*
less than half the unit shown
data not available
manufactured exports shown
data refer to 1999
Source: Adapted from UNDP, 2002
as percentage of exports in brackets
The next section takes a brief look at Taiwan's rise to high-technology industrial
success over the past four decades.
TAIWAN'S ECONOMIC RISE: A BRIEF HISTORY
An Agricultural Country: the 1940s
Taiwan had a varied history of colonization since the 16th century, during which it
was subjected to periods of Dutch, Spanish, Manchu and Japanese rule. Japan
handed the island over to China in 1945. In 1895, when Japan acquired Taiwan, its
agriculture was stagnant and its peasants were engaged almost exclusively in
subsistence farming (Ho, 1968). Over the next 50 years, Japan selectively developed
certain aspects of the Taiwanese economy, the main objectives of its policy being to
supply the Japanese empire with agricultural products, create demand for Japanese
industrial products (ibid.), facilitate Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia
(Amsden, 2001), and provide Japan with processed goods from the raw materials
Japan imported from Southeast Asia (Hobday, 1995).
Industrial diversification did not go far in Taiwan, where the manufacturing sector
remained dominated by food processing, particularly sugar refining (Amsden, 2001).
However, Taiwan did achieve rapid and sustained agricultural growth, despite
widespread tenancy and very unequal land distribution (Myers and Ching, 1964). Ho
(1968) attributes this growth to technological change; in the period 1920-1940,
agriculture began to take the form of a modern, scientifically-oriented sector.
Agricultural science was promoted through improved seeds and cultivation
techniques (ibid.), which the Japanese promoted by working through the landlord
and wealthy farmer classes (Myers and Ching, 1964). Ho (1968) also emphasizes the
role played by modern rural institutions in making scientific farming an effective
agent of growth. It was through such institutions, he claims, that the findings of
agricultural science were introduced, disseminated, adopted and applied. He sums
up their importance by saying (1968, p. 327): "Perhaps the lesson of Taiwanese
agriculture is not that scientific farming is important, but rather that science alone
cannot transform agriculture without certain rural organizations being created first
or at least concomitantly."
Agriculture continued to play an important role in the Taiwanese economy until the
1970s. Land reforms in the 1950s increased farm production, and high yields
permitted the export of surplus (GIO, 2003). The foreign exchange thus generated
was used to purchase raw materials, machinery and equipment for the industrial
sector. Eventually, traditional agriculture was replaced by high-value crops. Exports
of agricultural surplus then became exports of processed agricultural goods. In
1959, 90 percent of Taiwan's exports were agriculture or food related (GIO, 2003).
The Transformation Begins: the 1950s
Over the coming decades, Taiwan was to transform itself from an agricultural
country to an industrial one with a strong economic dependence on manufactured
exports. The 1 950s mark the beginning of this transition and are characterized by a
range of measures adopted by the government to protect infant industry. A
combination of factors led to the Taiwan government's decision to promote the
import substitution of textiles: the inability to continue importing textiles from
China, the fact that imports from Japan were eating up foreign exchange, and the
presence of Chinese mainlanders with extensive textile-manufacturing experience
(Amsden, 2001). These import substitution policies included stringent import
measures, high tariffs, and multiple exchange rates (Wu and Tseng, 1998). The aims
were to restrict the availability of foreign products in the local market and to nurture
domestic enterprise. The government assisted entrepreneurs in order to boost
investment, and many of these early entrepreneurs later became the founders of
large business groups (Amsden, 2001). Other industries began to flourish too, such
as flour-milling and machine tools (again largely due to the experience brought by
the Chinese 6migr s, and these, by and large, took the form of small businesses
(ibid.)). According to Ho (1978 in Amsden, 2001), a remarkable degree of import
substitution occurred in less than a decade; by 1954, imports as a percentage of
supply were only 3.8 percent.
Thus, at this point, Taiwan was a suitable locale for foreign original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) 18 to source their parts and components (Amsden, 2001). At
the same time, the import substitution policies were proving insufficient in boosting
the Taiwanese economy due to the small size of the Taiwanese market, which
limited economies of scale (Wu and Tseng, 1998). In the absence of other large
markets, industries could not create new jobs (Yeh, 2001). Trade deficits were
significant because of the import of equipment and raw materials for domestic
industries, and expansion in the production of agricultural products was limited by
18 OEM is a term that stands for Original Equipment Manufacturer. Over the years, the term manufacturer
has become very loose and often means maker or assembler. It is a term to segment out a section of the
industry that creates computers or computer equipment. Since 1985 the term has come to mean
unnamed or unbranded. Hence, a manufacturer of unbranded products or a reseller that brands
unbranded products to a proprietary brand or name.
(http: / /www.csqnetwork.com /qlossaryo.html/#OEM), the Computer Support Group Network Online.
the slow expansion of arable land (ibid.). Therefore, the government decided on a
drive towards export growth, of the products of both local and foreign firms.
The Move into Manufacturing: the 1960s and 1970s
Export promotion policies began to be put in place alongside the import substitution
policies, and continued when Taiwan began to ease restrictions on imports and open
its domestic market to foreign products. Wu and Tseng (1998)19 discuss the three
main effects of the policies. Firstly, the removal of trade restrictions and lowering of
import tariffs allowed local enterprises to learn from imported products that were
now entering the domestic market. This learning experience was to help Taiwan
tremendously in the future. Secondly, a range of measures was adopted to actively
boost exports. In order to lower production costs, imported machinery, materials,
and semi-finished products were exempted from taxes if they were used to produce
exported goods. The currency was depreciated. Various tax refund schemes were
put in place to help reduce the cost of exports. In 1972, these tax refunds amounted
to 62 percent of all tax revenue. Banks provided low-interest loans to exporters -
critically important for the small and medium-sized enterprises. Close government-
industry contact allowed the regular adjustment of incentives to permit the
manufacturing sector to adapt to new foreign market shifts (Davies, 1981). The
government made clear to investors that the priority it placed on developing exports
would continue into the future (ibid.).
Third, the government established export-processing zones (EPZs) to attract
multinational corporations to move their production bases to Taiwan (Wu and Tseng,
1998). Import and export procedures were kept as simple as possible for these firms
to reduce their administrative costs, and they were allowed to import machinery and
goods for reprocessing duty-free. The strategy worked very well; foreign capital
poured into Taiwan to take advantage of the ample and relatively inexpensive supply
of labor and the government's tax incentives. For Taiwan, this brought job
opportunities and foreign exchange, but, most importantly, it brought much needed
technology into the country. The technology, trained labor, and professionals spread
to other parts of the country as people relocated or started their own business. Most
of the foreign firms that moved into the EPZs were large multinational electronic
firms, and the technologies they transferred positioned Taiwan very well for its
eventual decision to develop the information industry.
19 The rest of the discussion in this section is based upon the work of Wu and Tseng (1998), unless stated
otherwise.
The export promotion policies helped the Taiwanese economy take off rapidly. Bass
(1999) has computed that Taiwanese exports grew on average by 11% per year from
1952 to 1965, and Wu and Tseng (1998) claim that the country's gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate reached an average of 10 percent annually over the 1 960s
and 1 970s. The export-oriented policies, in exposing domestic enterprises to the
competitive world market early on, taught them how to produce goods as simply
and cheaply as possible. Market forces guided local enterprises to concentrate in
sectors which Taiwan had a comparative advantage in at that time: textiles, clothing,
shoes, toys and consumer electronics (ibid.). Most of these required highly labor-
intensive technology. Table 3.2 shows Taiwan's progress over this period relative to
other developing countries.
Table 3.2 Average rate of Growth of GDP for Taiwan, Other Developing Countries, and
Developed Countries (Percent)
Taiwan East and Southeast Developing Developed
Asia (excl. Japan) countries countries
1950-1960
Real GDP at factor cost 7.4 4.0 4.6 3.7
Per capita GDP at factor cost 3.8 1.8 2.4 2.4
1960-1971
Real GDP 10.1 4.7 5.3 5.0
Per capitaGDP 7.3 2.3 2.7 3.9
Source: Ho (1978)
Between 1949 and 1973, manufacturing production increased at an average rate of
17.6 percent per year (Ho, 1978) and came to be the mainstay of the Taiwan
economy by the early 1970s. In 1973, it contributed 31 percent of Taiwan's GDP (in
current prices) at factor cost, accounted for over 90 percent of the exports, and
employed more than one quarter of the labor force (ibid.).
The 1970s onwards
(i) Machinery
Labor costs began to rise in the 1 970s, and producing labor-intensive goods
became costly (Wu and Tseng, 1998). Consequently, Taiwan began to lose its
comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive exports (Timmer, 2000). The
situation was further compounded by the energy crisis, which profoundly affected
the world economy (Li, 1995), and caused energy and wage costs to rise in Taiwan
(Davies, 1981). Taiwan began to experience a tightening of trade barriers in
developed countries and also to realize that it would face increasing competition in
the production of labor-intensive goods from China and Southeast Asia (ibid.).
Accordingly, the economy began to adjust itself towards the production of products
that were more capital and technology-intensive. Exports moved away from the
canned vegetables, clothing, plywood and cotton fabric of the early 1 970s towards
synthetic fibers and office machinery by the mid-1980s (Riedel, 1992 in: Timmer,
2000). According to Timmer (2000), a secondary phase of import substitution
began as industrial output gradually moved towards metal and machinery
manufacturing, in order to provide the domestic market with intermediate goods.
The move to machinery proved very successful; Taiwan eventually became the
world's fifth-largest machinery exporter (Chang et al., 2002), primarily due to the
industry's remarkable versatility. From numerical controls (NC) in 1955, the industry
first moved to computer numerical controls (CNC) in 1965, then to flexible
manufacturing systems (FMS) in 1975, and eventually computer-integrated
manufacturing (CIM) combined with factory automation in 1985, thus completely
overhauling the machinery industry (ibid.).
Thus the government's response to the loss in comparative advantage in labor-
intensive goods was to promote 'strategic', high-technology industries (Timmer,
2000). The long-term aim was to create a science and technology infrastructure to
support the technological efforts of private firms. Government policies to promote
science and technology are discussed later in this chapter.
(ii) Electronics
The development of the electronics industry in Taiwan initially relied on a multitude
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and benefited considerably from
transnational corporation (TNC) investments, joint ventures and foreign buyers
(Hobday, 1995). Taiwan's first mature, mid-technology export was the television,
where production was dominated by foreign-owned firms such as RCA (Amsden and
Chu, 2003). TNCs helped to foster the start-up of many of Taiwan's electronics
makers as large numbers of local firms supplied them with goods and services,
leading to a thriving subcontracting and OEM system. Under OEM, local firms made
products based on designs and plans provided by foreign companies. The finished
goods were then marketed and sold using the brand names of the foreign firms.
Large-scale production of monitors and terminals was initiated in Taiwan in 1980 by
foreign subsidiaries, and national firms quickly increased their production and
exports. By 1983, a mere three years after start-up, nationally-owned firms
accounted for more than 63 percent of output and 60 percent of exports of
monitors, and 51 percent of output and 52 percent of exports of terminals (Amsden
and Chu, 2003). Calculators, too, began to be mass-assembled in the 1 970s, based
almost entirely on imported components. Alongside television, they provided a
laboratory for learning mass production techniques, managerial as well as
technological (ibid.).
While OEM continues to be important in Taiwan, local firms increasingly provided
more comprehensive services for foreign firms procuring goods from Taiwan (EIU,
2001) and by 1989 the term 'original design manufacture' (ODM) was widely in use.
Latecomers learned to design and manufacture products then to be sold under a
foreign buyer's brand name. ODM provided an alternative to 'own-brand
manufacture' (OBM) for small firms and, importantly, it signified a new stage in
latecomer product innovation, going beyond processes learned under OEM and
subcontracting (ibid.). Under both ODM and OEM, exports focused domestic learning
efforts and helped to pull Taiwan's competitive capabilities forward. Some firms,
notably the personal computer maker Acer, have also begun OBM, developing their
own internationally recognized brands (EIU, 2001).
Taiwan's electrical appliance industry relied heavily on foreign investment. In 1975,
foreign firms accounted for over 80 percent of the electronics industry's exports
(Amsden and Chu, 2003). As the skills of national investors improved relative to
those of foreign investors, however, the involvement of the latter weakened. By
1998, they accounted for less than 8 percent (ibid., see Table 3.3, below).
Table 3.3 Share of foreign-owned firms in exports, by industry, 1975-1998 (%)
1975 1985 1991 1995 1998
Food 1.5 2.6 9.3 2.4 7.1
Textiles 25.9 7.3 3.0 6.9 3.7
Minerals 1 3.3 3.7 8.9 26.3 9.0
Metals 10.7 5.1 5.6 4.6 1.5
Machinery 22.7 13.6 7.8 12.1 10.0
Electronics 81.9 35.7 18.4 8.1 7.9
Other 9.1 3.5 5.4 10.0 5.1
Total industry 19.7 10.4 8.5 7.8 7.7
Source: Adapted from Taiwan, Ministry of Economic
Affairs, in: Amsden and Chu (2003)
The output of Taiwan's electronic and information industry grew by an average of
almost 15 percent per year during 1996-2000 EIU (2001). Taiwan moved very
successfully into the production and design of a range of high-technology electronic
products and components. By 1999, roughly 80 percent of the output value of its
information technology industry was accounted for by production of laptop
computers, monitors, desktop PCs, and motherboards (ibid.), and Taiwan is now the
world's leading manufacturer in about a dozen categories of computer-related
products (see details on some of these in Table 3.4). Taiwan's computer industry has
grown to be the third-largest exporter in the world for some years now, surpassed
only by USA and Japan, and its production of semiconductors is fourth-largest
worldwide (Hsu and Chiang, 2001).
Table 3.4 Taiwan's Global Market Share in Computer-Related Products (2000)
Product Taiwan's global market share (2000) (%)
Motherboards 70
Scanners 92.5
Computer cases 77
Power supplies 74
Notebook PCs 50
Desktop PCs 21
Source: EIU (2001)
Other considerations
Davies (1981) highlights domestic order and political stability as important factors in
the government's ability to play a strong and successful role in Taiwan's
development. Yeh (2001) also credits Taiwan's economic growth to its abundant
supply of diligent labor with a strong willingness to learn. Starting the late 1 950s,
the Taiwan government has followed a long-term strategy of improving education
and literacy by measures such as extending the duration for compulsory education,
and strongly encouraging vocational education (Yeh, 2001).
Taiwan received ample amounts of aid from the US until 1965. This was US$100
million annually, which, in certain periods, greatly helped offset trade deficits and
facilitated the import of daily necessities, capital equipment, and raw materials (Yeh,
2001). Yeh (2001), and Chan and Clark (1992) claim that this aid was not the key
factor in Taiwan's economic growth, however, since after 1965, when the aid was
discontinued, Taiwan did not suffer any setbacks in growth or investments. Aware
that the US aid was meant to be temporary, Taiwan had long planned on various
self-help measures (Yeh, 2001). Myint (1982) also claims that the importance of the
US aid factor is debatable, stating that during Taiwan's spectacular growth phase
during the 1963-73 period, it managed to do with very little net inflow of foreign
savings.
Taiwan's rapid technological advances were made possible by its carefully
engineered systems to induce innovation. These included both the creation of public
institutions that worked with the private sector, and appropriate policies to help
them function as planned. The remainder of the chapter describes some of the key
policies and institutions.
INNOVATION IN TAIWAN
Taiwan owes much of its success to the ability of its firms to continually adapt,
upgrade, and assimilate new technologies. Creating an environment to facilitate
these processes has been a major priority for the government of Taiwan (Tsai and
Wang, 2002), and putting in place the institutional framework to facilitate innovation
has been a vitally important achievement. The framework includes the creation of
science parks and public R&D institutes (Amsden and Chu, 2003), and was
supported by fiscal policies (ibid.) and periodically updated S&T plans (Li, 1995).
There are various reasons why the government deemed it necessary to assert itself
strongly in setting up the institutional environment for innovation. According to Tsai
and Wang (2002), Taiwanese firms were reluctant to invest in innovation. This was
due to (i) the fact that most of them were SMEs with limited resources and R&D
capabilities, (ii) the uncertainties and risks of R&D within high-tech industries, and
(iii) barriers associated with minimum scale (ibid.). Hsu and Chiang (2001) claim that
Taiwan was also relatively disadvantaged because of its shorter industrial history,
weaker technical capability, and scattered technology development investment. It
was therefore imperative for the government to design a technology strategy to
develop high-tech industries.
Key institutional and policy vehicles that drove Taiwan's industrial upgrading
process are discussed below.
POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS
Laying out National Goals and Plans
As early as 1959, the government of Taiwan laid out the guidelines for 'National
Long-Term Science and Technology Development'. A task force was established to
oversee the progress of the plan; its objectives were: planning and promoting long
term scientific research; reviewing R&D budget allocation; recruiting and involving
professors; and sponsoring S&T personnel to go abroad for advanced studies (Li,
1995). In 1967, the National Long-Term S&T Development Committee was
reorganized into the National Science Council (NSC), which was instructed in 1969
by the government to formulate a 'National Science Development Plan (1969-80)'
(ibid.). The Plan's overall goals were (i) to coordinate S&T and economic
development, and (ii) to stress applied technology research (Li, 1995). Specifically, it
made the following recommendations for science and development (ibid.):
i) strengthen basic education by upgrading curricula, faculty and facilities at
elementary, junior and senior high schools;
ii) improve the research environment at universities and research institutes in
order to produce manpower in high-tech;
iii) enhance R&D in the fields of industry, agriculture, transportation, medicine
and public health.
Li (1995) also highlights the role of National Conferences on Science and Technology
in laying out the path of future science and technology developments. These
Conferences had participation from academia, industry and government. In the first
Conference, held in 1978, the establishment of Hsinchu Science Park was decided
upon (discussed below), to accommodate the initiation of high-tech industries. It
was at this Conference that, for the first time, S&T policy was coordinated with
industrial development. At the second Conference in 1982, alongside decisions to
increase national research expenditure and further basic research, new strategic
research areas were identified: biotechnology, opto-electronics, food processing
technology, and hepatitis control. Successive conferences built upon the goals of the
previous ones; the third Conference, held in 1986, for instance, had as its goals the
following: broadening the R&D base; raising the quantity and quality of researchers;
enhancing R&D efficiency, expanding Hsinchu Science Park, helping the Industrial
Technology Research Institute (ITRI, discussed below) develop high-tech products
and technical know-how; introducing more high-tech firms to Taiwan, promoting
international S&T cooperation and strengthening technology transfer; and
broadening public awareness in S&T.
Establishment of Science Centers
In the 1960s, the Taiwan government took concrete steps to promote scientific
research to help spur industrialization. It set up five science centers (Li, 1995):
mathematics and chemistry centers at National Taiwan University, the physics center
at National Tsing Hwa University, the biology center at the Institute of Botany in the
Academia Sinica, and the engineering science center at the National Cheng Kung
University. Universities were encouraged to set up research institutes that would
offer Masters degrees. These steps contributed greatly to the growth of S&T
manpower, and the upgrading of R&D capability (ibid.).
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI)
The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was established by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (MOEA) in 1973 to provide technological support for Taiwan's
industrial development (ITRI, 2003). Initially created out of a telecommunications
laboratory in the Ministry of Communications (Meaney, 1994) by combining three
existing institutes, today ITRI has seven laboratories, five research centers and over
6000 personnel (ITRI, 2003). Its "open lab", an incubation facility for new firms, has
proven immensely successful in helping to provide them a firm footing.
ITRI has been referred to as "the powerhouse" behind Taiwan's entry into
information products, semiconductors and other advanced technologies (Matthews,
1999), and as the most dynamic institution in Taiwan's national innovation system.
It works closely with Taiwan's private sector, conducting pre-competitive research
on projects sponsored by MOEA with a view to transferring the outcomes to the
private sector non-exclusively (ibid.). It also conducts short and medium-term
research sponsored by private firms.
A major role of ITRI is to serve as a "global technology scanner and filter" (Matthews,
1999), keeping abreast of technological developments worldwide and developing
know-how in those technologies within its own labs. The aim is to spin these across
Taiwan's private sector as rapidly as possible through short-lived R&D alliances with
small and medium-sized Taiwanese manufacturing firms (ibid.). In this way,
Matthews (1999) states, ITRI is able to sign technology licensing deals with the
world's leading multinationals, and ensure that Taiwan's manufacturing firms gain
access to these licenses and produce state of the art products for export. In some
cases, they have been able to achieve this even before the originating multinationals
(ibid.). The rapid diffusion of advanced technologies from abroad to Taiwan's firms,
therefore, is attributable to ITRI (Matthews, 2001).
Matthews (2001) identifies the public-private sector cooperation witnessed through
ITRI as a characteristic feature of the country's technological upgrading strategies.
The movement of personnel from ITRI to the private sector helped boost the latter's
R&D capabilities and speeded up the process of technology diffusion (Tsai and
Wang, 2002). A very high proportion of the staff of UMC and TSMC, of Taiwan's
semiconductor industry, had previously been employed at ITRI (ibid.). In fact, ITRI
was responsible for the creation of these leading IC firms (Amsden and Chu, 2003).
Thus ITRI's programs are designed both to facilitate the creation of new industries
(such as semiconductors, chemicals, opto-electronics and aerospace), and to
upgrade existing industries (Matthews, 1999). It also actively initiated projects to
explore areas in which it felt the private sector could profitably invest next (Amsden
and Chum 2003). Additionally, after an industry started up, ITRI would undertake
smaller-scale projects to import-substitute key components, thereby furthering the
government's objective to always "create local growth opportunities and local value
added, besides upgrading the level of technology" (Amsden and Chu, 2003, p. 102).
ITRI, being a large organization, comprises several smaller organizations with
specific functions. For instance, the Electronic Research Service Organization (ERSO)
was set up to develop the IC project (Meaney, 1994). More will be said about ITRI's
organizational structure in the next chapter.
ITRI also formed key R&D alliances with SMEs. These alliances were an integral part
of Taiwan's industrial upgrading system. They are discussed in more detail in a
section below.
Science Parks
The creation of science parks constituted a major form of government support. One
was constructed in Hsinchu, south of Taipei, and another in southern Taiwan in
Tainan. The Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP) was established in 1980,
with the view of being a base for high-tech industries and the creation of a high-
quality environment for R&D (Tsai and Wang, 2002). The government picked which
firms would reside in these parks (Amsden and Chu, 2003) - seeking high-
technology industries of the future, and provided them with attractive benefits.
Firms residing in the park received a set of subsidies that included tax and import
duty exemptions, grants and subsidized credit, the provision of below-market rents
in high-quality factory buildings or sites, living amenities for high-caliber
researchers, and access to government and university research facilities (ibid.). The
Park also offered low-interest government loans; R&D matching funds; government
purchase of technology abroad for transfer to participating companies; and
government equity investment of up to 49 percent of enterprise capitalization
(Matthews, 1999). Modeled on the success of the Stanford Research Park in
California's Silicon Valley, the HSIP also offers as inducements ease of access, clean
environment, good housing and educational facilities, and land made available by
the government (ibid).
Hsinchu Science Park has played an important role in the development of the
following industries in Taiwan: integrated circuits (IC), computers and peripherals
(C&P), telecommunications, opto-electronics, precision machinery (PM), and
biotechnology (Lee and Yang, 2000). According to Liu (1989, p. 35 in Amsden and
Chu, 2003, p. 110), "The engine of economic growth in the 1 980s in Taiwan [was]
the information industry, while the Science-based Industrial Park [was] the driver of
the engine." All Taiwan's semiconductor companies, states Matthews (1 999) have
their fabrication and design facilities at HSIP, clustered around the facilities of TSMC,
the research and design facilities of ITRI/ERSO, and the leading national technical
universities of Chiaotung and Tsinghua. Many of Taiwan's leading IT firms, e.g., Acer
Inc, Acer Peripherals and Logitech also have research facilities at the Park (ibid.).
The success of the HSIP led to plans for its expansion (Lee and Yang, 2000) and also
to the NSC's decision to create a second science-based industry park, in Tainan. The
Tainan Science Park (TSP) was established in 1998 and 28 factories started their
construction there within the same year (ibid.). The four major industrial sectors
accommodated at the TSP are: microelectronics and ICs, precision machinery,
biotechnology, and agriculture (Matthews, 1999).
Since 1980, the Taiwan government invested more than US$583 million in software
and hardware facilities in HSIP (Lee and Yang, 2000) and by the end of 1998, the
HSIP housed 272 companies with combined annual sales of more than US$13 billion
(ibid.). According to Amsden and Chu (2003), Hsinchu Science Park accounted for a
large share of Taiwan's total R&D spending - as much as 19 percent in 1998.
Investments in TSP, according to Matthews (1999), are likely to be around US$2.9
billion. These are being channeled from the Hsinchu Park's operating fund and from
loans raised using existing assets, rather than through fresh government
appropriations.
Li (1995) identifies the following impacts of HSIP on hi-tech industries in Taiwan:
encouraging venture capitals into hi-tech industry since high risk and high
returns are two characteristics of hi-tech industries, the government needed
to encourage traditional enterprises to invest in venture capital companies
and introduce high technology from. HSIP helped towards this end.
disseminating technology to accelerate the upgrading of industries: many
components needed for production in the Park were supplied by small and
medium sized enterprises outside the Park. To ensure the quality of the
components, the Park's high-tech companies assisted their suppliers in
technical education and personnel training. This helped upgrade the
technology of many satellite companies.
e attracting overseas Chinese S&T manpower to start up business in Taiwan:
the favorable working and living environment in the Park induced many
overseas Chinese S&T personnel to return to Taiwan to invest in the Park.
Over half the companies in the Park at present were founded by overseas
Chinese scholars and engineers who brought back specialized production
technology.
According to Amsden and Chu (2003), the conditions for admission into HSIP (in
1980) were as follows:
1. A firm had to have the ability to design products for manufacturing according
to a business plan.
2. It had to have produced products that had undergone initial R&D that was
still in progress.
3. It had to have manufactured products with a potential for development and
innovation.
4. It had to have engaged in high-level innovation and R&D in a research
department that conformed with a minimum specified size.
5. It had to have adopted production processes that required the introduction
of training in advanced technology, or the spending of fairly large sums on
R&D.
6. It was required to employ a staff within three years after marketing a product
or service comprising no less than 50 percent of local technical personnel.
7. Its operations had to contribute significantly to Taiwanese economic
reconstruction and national defense.
National Laboratories
To promote large-scale research, the NSC has been coordinating with agencies and
research institutes since the mid-1980s to plan the establishment of national
laboratories (Li, 1995). In addition to the research facilities that NSC helped provide
at universities, research institutes, and the Science Parks, five additional laboratories
went under construction (ibid.): (i) Synchrotron Radiation Research Center (SRRC), (ii)
Laboratory Animal Breeding and Research Center, (iii) Nanodevice Laboratory, (iv)
Seismic Engineering Research Center, and (v) Center for High-Performance
Computing. Other laboratories being planned include the National Space Laboratory
and the High-temperature Superconductor Laboratory (ibid.). These labs will
contribute to high-tech academic research in Taiwan.
R&D Alliances
ITRI forged alliances with the private sector, particularly SMEs, which became
sophisticated devices for the rapid dissemination of new technological capabilities
through Taiwanese industry (Matthews, 1999). Alliances were formed in the areas of
notebook computers, high-definition television, fax and communications
equipment, etc. (Tsai and Wang, 2002). These alliances led to a process where R&D
costs could be shared, and risks reduced, by bringing several small firms into a
collaborative alliance with each other and with ITRI (Matthews, 2001), with ITRI
serving as the anchor for the alliance.
The main goal of the alliances, according to Matthews (2001), is rapid adoption of
new technological standards products or processes developed elsewhere, and their
rapid diffusion to as many firms as possible. Early on, the initiative for the formation
of alliances came exclusively from public agencies (largely ITRI or MOEA), but the
private sector has been taking an increasingly active role as the institutional form of
the consortia has evolved, to the point where private firms were taking the initiative
in forming alliances by the end of the 1 990s (ibid.).
These alliances have accelerated technological catch-up and learning, and resulted
in a series of successful industry interventions. Taiwan's current dominance of
laptop PCs for example, is partly due to a public-private sector led consortium that
rushed a product to world markets in 1991 (Matthews, 2001). Similarly, Taiwan's
strong performance in data switches, which are used in PC networks, rests on a
consortium that worked with ITRI to produce a switch to match the Ethernet
standard, in 1992-93 (ibid.). Also, Taiwan's emerging success in the automotive
industry, driven by its development of a 1.21 four-valve engine, was again the
product of a collaborative research endeavor involving three companies that have
now jointly created the Taiwan Engine Company to produce the product (ibid.). Thus
Taiwan used R&D consortia as an effective organizational form of promoting catch-
up industry and technological upgrading.
Government-Led Networking
The Taiwan government took certain regulatory steps that favored the development
of nationally-owned firms (Amsden and Chu, 2003). It imposed a variety of stringent
restrictions on foreign entry, particularly in the early phases of a service industry's
modernization (ibid.). Foreign participation in one of Taiwan's cell-phone service
companies was limited to 20 percent through 2000; foreign banks could engage in
some types of business but were not allowed to accept local deposits until 1990;
foreign builders of Taiwan's high-speed rail were required by the Taiwan
government to include national firms as joint venture partners or collaborators
(ibid.). Foreign real estate companies could not speculate inland and foreigners in
general faced other restrictions on land ownership. Later, restrictions on foreign
investment in services were selectively removed under pressure from the United
States and Taiwan's need to comply with WTO law in order to become a WTO
member (lbid). However, government restrictions on foreign investment in services
in the early stages of market-opening allowed nationally controlled firms to capture
second mover advantage (ibid.).
Innovation Incubators
The Small and Medium Enterprise Association (SMEA) at the MOEA has promoted the
establishment of incubators since 1996. While ITRI's are perhaps most renowned,
incubation facilities are also being set up elsewhere. By 2002, the SMEA had
promoted 63 incubators and attracted around 900 firms to move into them (Tsai and
Wang, 2002).
The aims of innovation incubators for SMEs in Taiwan are threefold, according to
Tsai and Wang (2002). Firstly, they promote the innovative ability of SMEs. Secondly,
they serve as a bridge between the industrial sector and academic institutions,
helping to transfer academic research results to industry. And thirdly, they play the
role of regional innovation centers and tend to promote the competitiveness of local
industry.
Industry Associations
Industry associations have played a significant role as intermediaries between state
agencies and firms in Taiwan (Matthews, 1999). Major industries - IT,
semiconductors, and automotive, have industry associations that help drive
industrial upgrading by acting as an interface between firms and government
agencies. Matthews (1999) states that the relationship between government
agencies and industries in Taiwan is one of 'governed interdependence', a
productive and complementary relationship in which each side provides a necessary
complement to the other. Government agencies require the private sector for
implementation of their policies, while the private sector needs public agencies for
the coordination of catch-up activities, particularly in financial allocation, risk
sharing and technological upgrading (ibid).
Relations between the public and private sector are not fixed, but tend to evolve.
Thus the firms and public agencies co-evolve, each adapting to changes in the
others, thus stimulating a mutually dependent process of change and development
(ibid.). Matthews (1999) states that the Taiwan government's strategies for the
creation of industry have been explicit, with its agencies such as the ITRI insistent
that firms must learn to survive and prosper in a world of fierce competition.
Government assistance to the industry - the nurturing of enterprises while in a
fledgling state - did not expand to encompass trade protection or the rescue of
enterprises facing operational difficulties (ibid). Thus, the history of the creation of
the industry in Taiwan is littered with bankruptcies, e.g., that of Quasel in the mid-
1980s - where government refused to intervene to rescue the company in distress
(ibid.). This would have defeated the goal of public policy, which was to ensure that
firms become independent and internationally competitive (ibid).
Recovery of Public In vestment
Taiwan has developed an innovative approach to assessing the value of public
investment in industry creation and upgrading (Matthews, 1999). Rather than
requiring investments to be immediately 'cost effective', the government looks to
the long term, for a return in taxes paid by successfully launched companies (ibid.).
This approach, Matthews (1999) states, rests on the twin propositions that private
R&D expenditure will eventually exceed public R&D expenditure; and company tax
revenues will eventually exceed public funds paid out as R&D support.
Tax Incentives
Tax incentives offered by the government to the private sector were important in
reducing the level of risk manufacturers were required to absorb when undertaking
R&D and personnel cultivation (Tsai and Wang, 2002). The Statute for Industrial
Upgrading and Promotion was promulgated on 1 Jan 1999, with goal of using tax
incentives to encourage companies to undertake R&D, automation, personnel
training and other activities (ibid.). Also, investment tax credits were offered to
investors holding shares in companies in high-tech industries, and a five-year tax
exemption was made available to companies within these industries as well as
venture capital companies (ibid.). The Statute achieved good results in terms of
stimulating expenditure, the impact on the economy as a whole, and the
contribution made to industrial upgrading.
Venture Capital
A non-government factor in the development of SMEs was venture capitalists, who
tend to invest in emerging industries with strong development potential on the basis
of expert knowledge available to them. Venture capital funds provide capital as well
as management assistance. Since the object of venture capital investment is usually
an individual or an SME, venture capital in Taiwan has made a substantial
contribution to the growth of SMEs, particularly those in emerging industries (Tsai
and Wang, 2002).
Taiwan's first venture capital company was established in 1984 (ibid). Although its
growth rate was slow initially, 199 venture capital companies were set up by the end
of 2001 (ibid.). The annual growth rate in the number of venture capital companies
and the amount of venture capital investment exceeded 50 percent in 1997 and
1998 (ibid.). Such growth has also speeded up the development of the high-tech
sector.
International Linkages
The links of Taiwan's industry and academia to Taiwanese- and Chinese-American
engineers and scientists in the US have played a remarkably important role in the
country's development. These entities have contributed in terms of research advice,
joint research and facilitation of technology transfer, as well as by returning to
Taiwan to do research. Research links with foreign industry and research institutes
have also been - and continue to be - very important.
Conclusions
Taiwan has achieved economic success in a remarkably short period of time. This is
largely attributable to the successful development of high-tech industry in the
country. The government has played a key role in promoting scientific learning and
technological innovation, through the establishment of certain institutions and the
formulation of sound policy.
The next chapter examines in detail one of the most important institutions created
for technological learning and upgrading in Taiwan, the Industrial Technology
Research Institute (ITRI). This thesis espouses the belief that Taiwan's largely SME-
based industry would not have been able to achieve the degree of success that it has
in the absence of such a large, government-supported research and technology
implementation institute. The next chapter looks at ITRI's functions, its
organizational structure, and institutional set-up.
4 ITRI: AN OVERVIEW
Chapter 3 looked at Taiwan's rapid climb to global high-tech leader. This chapter
examines the vital role ITRI played in bringing this about. It will show how ITRI has
been largely responsible for Taiwan's economic and technological success, starting
as early as the late 1970s when Taiwan decided to move into semiconductor
technology. It also builds on the overview of Taiwan's innovation system presented
in Chapter 3, in showing how ITRI fits into this system.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section looks at ITRI's goals and
history: which factors led to its establishment; which early influences helped mould
it; what kind of politics were involved; and how it expanded into its current
dimensions. Given the national focus at the time, the emergence of semiconductor
technology is a main theme. The second section presents an overview of ITRI - its
labs and centers, core research areas, and notable contributions to Taiwanese
development. Lastly, this chapter examines ITRI within the wider institutional
framework of Taiwan to answer questions such as: how does it fit in with other
research institutes and universities; how pivotal a role does ITRI play within Taiwan's
innovation system; and what are ITRI's prospects for the future?
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
Mission
Since its establishment 1973, ITRI's vision has been "to become an outstanding
research institute that uses technological innovation to assist Taiwan's industry in
fulfilling the challenge of a knowledge-based economy"20 . Its goal is to address both
Taiwan's current industrial needs and its future growth. It does the latter by
anticipating the marketplace and thus staying ahead of the innovation curve of
20 This and the following information are taken from ITRI's online brochure, available at
http: / /www.itri.org.tw/enq/about/download/intro.eng.pdf
modern industry. Such long-range development is mostly government-funded, while
contract and project work from industry tends to focus on current developments21 .
Regarding Taiwan's current industrial needs, ITRI's main objectives are to:
- engage in applied research and technical services to accelerate the industrial
development of Taiwan.
- develop key, compatible, forward-looking technologies to meet industrial needs and
strengthen industrial competitiveness.
- disseminate research results to the industrial sector in a timely and appropriate manner,
in accordance with the principles of fairness and openness.
- foster the technology development of small and medium-sized businesses, and
cultivating industrial technology human resources for the benefit of the nation.
ITRI's efforts focus both on upgrading existing industry and promoting new, high-
technology industry.
The Early Days 22
In the early 1970s, the Taiwan government realized that a labor-intensive industry
would not take the economy very far, and began to plan what the new focus should
be (Wu and Tseng, 1998). After much deliberation, the electronics industry was
chosen. As discussed below, ITRI was created to help achieve this goal. Its efforts
had tremendous impact, working as it did in close cooperation with other state
institutes, national committees, universities and industry - both domestic and
foreign.
Establishment of ITRI
In 1974, Y.K. Sun, a former Premier of Taiwan and an electrical engineer by training,
invited Dr Pan from the US to Taiwan to obtain suggestions on ways in which Taiwan
could upgrade local industry with electronics playing the lead role. Pan, in a meeting
with top officials that included the Premier, recommended that (i) the electronics
industry focus on semiconductor technology and the technology be acquired from
abroad; (ii) a two-part strategic planning team be formed, one in the United States
and one in Taiwan; and (iii) an organizational capability for implementation within
21 This is according to a page on ITRI's website, http:/ /www.itri.org.tw/enq /about/index.sp
22 The discussion presented here on the early days of ITRI is based on Constance Meaney's (1994)
narrative, unless otherwise stated.
Taiwan be set up. Also, they decided to locate a US partner that could provide
technology transfer and training. Thus began Taiwan's new long-term project: the
manufacture of integrated circuits (ICs) 23 .
To create organizational capacity in electronics R&D within Taiwan, Sun established
ITRI in 1973-74. Although the original plan was to locate it in the Ministry of
Communications, Sun wanted a high degree of autonomy for the Institute and,
despite opposition, had it placed under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA),
which he at the time headed, although it was located in an existing communications
laboratory. It is important that ITRI was actually formed by the merging of three
existing research institutes: Union Industry, Union Mining Industry and Metal
Industry (Li, 1995). Within ITRI, the Electronics Research Service Organization (ERSO)
was set up to develop the IC project.
Originally, both ITRI and ERSO were funded entirely by the state. However, as
companies began to pay fees to have products developed for them, private-sector
contributions rose. By 1988, ERSO and ITRI received about 25 percent and 55
percent respectively from the government. Today government and industry provide
roughly 50 percent each to ITRI. ITRI's budget is screened within the MOEA and
approved by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), the Legislative Yuan, the National Science
Council (NSC), and the Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG).
TAC Input to ITRI
Believing that it was important to have a strategic planning group based in the
United States, Dr Pan invited engineers from Bell labs, IBM and various universities to
form a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). TAC's tasks were to help in selecting a
particular IC technology to concentrate on, and to recommend a list of US companies
that could be invited to submit bids for a technology-transfer agreement. Since its
inception, TAC has regularly provided ITRI/ERSO information on industry trends and
on the experience of US laboratories with different approaches to product
development. TAC also submits proposals for the next major thrust of Taiwan's IC
program.
Links with RCA
Human capacity-building in Taiwan's new project benefited greatly from early ties
with RCA which, in late 1975, was chosen out of eight companies that had submitted
23 An electronic circuit where all the elements of the circuit are integrated together on single
semiconductor substrate. (http:// icknowledge.com/glossary/i.html)
bids. The two main points of Taiwan's strategy were (a) to emphasize training as
well as technology-transfer, and (b) to solicit private investment and move
technology into the private sector. RCA agreed to provide technicians plus technical
training in the United States over the next five years, as well as design and
production capabilities. In addition, it agreed to transfer all technological advances
and improvements in design and processing, as well as provide information on
product applications. In return, ITRI would purchase a certain quantity of wafers24.
Dr Pan recommended that forty young engineers be sent to RCA for training in
relevant fields (processing, design, testing, plant engineering, accounting and
reliability studies) who, upon their return, would take up positions within ERSO. The
same year, 1976, construction began on an IC pilot project facility within ERSO, and
in 1977-78, the first trial run of wafers was produced. The objective was to transfer
technology to local industry after the pilot production phase, while increasing
production capacity and improving quality control.
Efforts of NSC
Taiwan's National Science Council (NSC) had begun a major drive in 1974-75 to
establish IC research locally. Under its "large-scale project on microelectronics",
various labs were set up in IC process technology, personal computer applications,
and automatic technologies. Professor Hu Ting-hua was in charge of the labs for IC
process technology at Chiao Tung University. In 1975, he left for ERSO, taking many
students and faculty with him, thus further contributing the buildup of human
capacity at ITRI/ERSO.
ICs go Commercial: the Creation of UMC
A primary goal of the state's semiconductor project was to move technology out of
the lab and into the private sector. To this end, Shih Chin-tay, one of the key
engineers recruited by Dr Pan and trained at RCA, and his boss at ERSO, Hu Ting-
hua, submitted a business proposal in 1978 for a joint state-private semiconductor
venture to the MOEA. The MOEA then tried to interest private sector entities in
investing, but they were reluctant, viewing ICs as a highly risky business. Eventually,
though, the government did manage to get some contributions from them, albeit
small. ITRI also created the subsidiary Industrial Technology Investment Corporation
24 A wafer is a round disc of semiconductor material, most commonly Silicon. They are a few millimeters
thick and are available in a variety of diameters. Many integrated circuits are simultaneously fabricated on
wafers. (Taken from http:/ /www.icknowledge.com/glossary/w.html)
(ITIC) to reassure private companies; ITRI provided 40 percent of ITIC's support for
the IC venture; the rest came from banks and private investors.
The result was the creation of United Microelectronics (UMC), a joint state-private
sector venture. Much of the plant, equipment and trained personnel were transferred
by ERSO, which continued with the pilot production of wafers in its own facility. After
UMC was formed, however, a conflict arose: its management wanted ERSO's pilot
facility closed down; ERSO was turning out 15,000 wafers a month, and had the
same products and market channels as UMC. UMC claimed that there was no need
for government, via ERSO, to stay in the business of wafer production and sales. Shih
Chin-tay and others remained firm, however, that ITRI needed to stay involved to
ensure continuous R&D. ERSO continued production.
Developments, 1979-1985
In 1979, professors were invited to work at ERSO to gain industrial experience. Also
around this time, some ERSO engineers were in favor of the idea of separating
manufacturing and design in the IC project. Thus Taiwan would develop a design
methodology and train engineers who would become small entrepreneurs.
Sun became Premier in 1979, and, no longer directly overseeing ITRI/ERSO, created
the Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG), through which he could remain
involved in their functioning. STAG consisted of foreign advisors with experience in
the semiconductor industry. Sun also approved a plan for the future of science and
technology in Taiwan in which he identified eight high-technology areas, including
ICs.
UMC had become highly successful by this time, its wafer production and sales
overtaking ERSO's. It began to make its own R&D and licensing agreements with US
companies, and, in 1985, went public, with the government remaining a minority
shareholder.
In 1982, it was decided that ITRI/ERSO would focus the semiconductor program on
VLS125 technology. The objective was to provide a base for expanding Taiwan's R&D
capacity. Some felt that the plan was too ambitious, since even Canada and France
had tried and failed. Some felt that too many resources were going into
semiconductors, at the expense of biotechnology and automation. Also, the industry
25 very Large-Scale Integration; integrated circuits with greater than 100,000 transistors.
(http: / /icknowledge.com/glossary/v.html)
disagreed that ITRI should have a part in this; UMC wanted to do the VLSI
development itself. STAG, however, supported ITRI/ERSO.
VLSI and the Formation of TSMC
ERSO began to support VLSI design projects in universities; professors were invited
to ITRI over the summer and encouraged to do VLSI wafer design projects with their
students, which ITRI would then process. The initial years of the VLSI project
encountered difficulties, however, due to the reluctance of the private sector to
invest, and the reluctance of the state to commit large amounts of capital.
Eventually, the government formed a second joint venture company, Taiwan
Semiconductor (TSMC), with contributions of 49 percent, 27 percent and 24 percent
from the Taiwan government, Philips, and local private investors respectively. TSMC
aimed at being a world-class semiconductor facility, specializing in manufacture but
not design or marketing. It also served small design houses located at HSIP; within a
year after TSMC's formation, forty chip design houses were set up there. After the
success of UMC and TSMC, several other private semiconductor firms started up,
among them Winboard Electronics, the founder of which left ERSO and took a large
number of its personnel with him to start the company.
Given the increasing number of actors involved in semiconductors, STAG felt the
need to increase its organizational capacity. It set up technical review boards that
would present recommendations to ITRI. STAG eventually persuaded ITRI/ERSO to
move ahead with the risky business of memory chips, so that it could become a
world-class competitor independent of foreign manufacturers.
DRAM 26 Chip Production
Submicron technology, necessary for the production of DRAMs, became ERSO's new
focus by 1988. Taiwan's six existing IC companies were invited to become part of a
research consortium with ERSO, with the government covering all equipment
expenses and half of the ongoing costs. After much discussion, and spurred by
Acer's decision to move into DRAMs, ERSO/ITRI/TSMC eventually moved into DRAM
technology.
26 Dynamic Random Access Memory; a type of semiconductor memory where data may be accessed at
random and data must be continuously refreshed. DRAMs will only hold data for a few milliseconds so the
data must be read and re-written every millisecond or so. (http://icknowledge.com/glossary/d.html)
The history of Taiwan's success with ICs, it can be seen, features ITRI/ERSO playing a
leading role in product research, development and design, as well as being a chief
coordinating institution between state, industry and academia. Taiwan's first two
semiconductor companies were both spin-offs of ERSO (Table 4.1 shows other ITRI
spin-off companies). The emphasis was heavily on semiconductor technology
initially, since this is what the Taiwan government singled out to give its economy a
new direction.
Table 4.1 ITRI's Role: Commercialization and Entrepreneurship
Year Company (ITRI Spin-off) Details
1979 UMC First 4" wafer fab27 in Taiwan; US$1,886 million
(2001)
1987 TSMC First 6" wafer fab in Taiwan; US$3,726 million
(2001)
1988 TMC First mask 28 fab in Taiwan; US$84 million (2001)
1994 VISC First 8" wafer fab in Taiwan; US$266 million (2001)
2001 TTLA First TFT-LCD alliance in Taiwan
Source: Shih (2002)
ITRI TODAY
With eleven labs and research centers, plus a large incubation facility for industry,
ITRI conducts high-quality R&D in a range of high-tech fields. It has over 6,000
personnel, of whom about 4,600 are research staff. Figure 4.1 shows ITRI's labs and
centers.
27 "Wafer fab: is a facility where the wafer fabrication process is performed
(http://icknowledge.com/glossary/w.html)
28 A mask is a glass plate with a pattern of transparent and opaque areas used to photolithographically
create patterns on wafers. A mask is commonly used to refer to a plate that has a pattern large enough to
pattern a whole wafer at one time (http://icknowledge.com/glossary/m.html)
Fig. 4.1 Overview of ITRI Centers and Laboratories
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Main Research Areas29
ITRI's main research areas are shown in Table 4.2 below.
29 These descriptions are based on those provided by the ITRI website.
Table 4.2 ITRI's Main Research Areas
RESEARCH AREA GOAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
To master energy saving and minimization ITRI is adopting mobile communication and broadband internet
Communication and technology by establishing system-on-a- technology development and application as the core of its
Opto-electronic chip, nano-electronics and opto-electronic research in the communication and opto-electronics field. The
Technology technology. Also, to reinforce inter- Institute takes advantage of the existent basis of wireless
laboratory collaboration on module and communication, broadband communication, IC design, intelligent
component development based on information and opto-electronic information technology. ITRI is
intelligent opto-communication systems. moving toward advanced research areas such as beyond 3G
network technology, wireless data access, broadband data
access technology, intelligent opto-communication network
technology, human interface and information technology,
advanced flatpanel display technology, and nano electronic
technology.
To accelerate the local industrialization of
key materials and components supplied ITRI focuses on research of electronic packaging, electronic
Materials and for domestic semiconductor, opto- materials, specialty chemicals, functional polymer materials,
Chemical electronics and communications catalysts and precision chemical engineering process, high-
Technology industries; to help traditional plastics, performance metals, and nano-technologies for materials, It has
metal and certain electronics companies developed bi-layer silicone-containing photoresist, nano-sized
upgrade through close industry pigment, resin coated copper foil materials, polymer lithium
cooperation; to concentrate on innovative, battery, metal semi-solid forming, metallocene-based COC and
advanced technology research, opto-electronic applications, hi-tech fibers, high resolution
developing next-generation materials with advanced recordable media, electro-acoustic composite and
the aim of maintaining Taiwan's nano-composite materials.
competitiveness in the global market.
Innovative technology development, such
as micro and nano technologies, MEMS Technology development: ITRI combines its strengths in
Precision Machinery technologies, precision machinery, semi- electronic engineering, measuring, aerospace and automation
and MEMS conductor process equipment, automation, technologies. Main research results include advanced LIGA-like
Technology electronic machinery, power train system process, nano measurement, micro systems & key components
and avionics retrofit, etc. ITRI aims to design and fabrication, common engine, electrical scooter, PC
upgrade domestic electronics, opto- based controller, computer integrated manufacturing system, and
electronics and biomedical industries, and avionics information and entertainment system etc.
to develop new industries.
Cross-disciplinary sustainable development research that
Sustainable To improve business operations, fortify integrates energy and resources technology, fresh-water and
Development market competitiveness, increase ocean resources technology, land protection technology,
Technology resource utilization, and reduce working industrial safety and hygiene technology, and environmental
environment hazards. technology.
Key research projects include biochips, bioinformatics,
To contribute to developments in biomaterials, regeneration, medical electronics, medical image,
Biomedical pharmaceuticals engineering, medical herbal therapeutics and peptide drug development. Clinical
Technology engineering and human tissue studies are conducted in collaboration with universities and
engineering, by adopting genomics hospitals such as National Taiwan University Hospital, Veterans
technology as a core research area. General Hospital, Tni-Service General Hospital, Chang Gung
Memorial Hospital and the National Cheng Kung University
Hospital. Several joint research programs are also in progress
with international biomedical research institutes such as MIT and
CSIRO.
The primary nanotechnology research in ITRI covers nano-
Nanotechnology To establish platform technologies to materials, nanoelectronics and nano-biotechnology. Main
support nanoresearch, such as research areas include Integrated circuit, electronic packaging,
processing, measuring, modeling, and display devices, data storage, opto-communication, nano-
equipment development, biotechnology and energy technology, such as microfuel cells.
Major research results include several world leading
technologies, such as nano pigment, paint, dyestuff, advanced
recordable media inorganic, carbon nanotube field emission
display (CNT-FED), SiGe quantum devices nano-composite and
Sustainable__ To__ improvebusiness__ operations,__fortify high capacity battery and capacitors.
The Funding of ITRI
ITRI obtains half of its funding from the government and the other half from
industry. In 2002, it had a revenue of US$475 million, which was distributed as
follows (Hsu, 2003):
Communication and opto-electronic technology 47%
Precision machinery and MEMS technology 26%
Biomedical technology 13%
Advanced materials and chemical technology 12%
Sustainable development technology 5%
Others 2%
ITRI has decided to allocate NT$23 billion to pursue nanotechnology research over
the next six years; NT$9.5 billion for biotechnology research from 2002-04; NT$7.6
billion for research on system-on-a-chip for the next five years; and has recently
spent NT$12.84 billion for communication R&D for 1998-2003 (Shih, 2002).
One concern with the rigid cost-sharing agreement with MOEA, however, is that it
becomes necessary to conduct mostly those projects that are near
commercialization (WTEC, 1997). Thus during discussion about future research
projects in nanoparticle technology, this arrangement posed an obstacle to doing
electro-optical projects (ibid.). The focus was therefore directed more towards
coating-and-structural-materials-related applications.
ITRI's impacts and accomplishments
Upgrading Existing/Traditional Industry
ITRI has contributed to the upgrading of the sporting industry, in improving tennis
rackets and golf clubs. It has also improved plated plastics, machine tools and parts,
fabrics, and pharmaceuticals. A particularly successful case is that of the bicycle
industry. In 1987, ITRI's Materials Research Lab helped the company Giant develop a
carbon fiber bicycle frame, which was remarkably successful. By the 1 990s, the Lab
had secured 17 patents pertaining to the bicycle derailleur (Amsden and Chu, 2003).
Taiwan currently produces 60 percent of the world's carbon fiber composite bicycles
(Lin, 2003).
Promotion of High- Technology Industry in Taiwan
in addition to spinning off several semiconductor firms (discussed earlier) and thus
largely to be credited for Taiwan's current global rank of fourth in the IC industry,
CD-ROMs are another success story. In 1992, ITRI was asked by MOEA to develop
CD-ROMs. The project involved 25 firms in joint development and technology
transfer. Four patents were secured for CD-ROMs and twenty-four for CD-ROM
pickup heads (Amsden and Chu 2003). Firms that acquired CD-ROM technology
from ITRI were able to begin assembly operations immediately. Taiwan's share of
CD-ROMs output rose from 1 percent in 1994 to 50 percent within a space of five
years (ibid.). Another success story is that of the notebook PC industry, the evolution
of which ITRI has been heavily involved in. By 2000, Taiwan was producing nearly 65
percent of the world's notebook PCs (Lin, 2003). Further, ITRI has been involved in
the design and production of the many computer peripherals that Taiwan now has
high global output in (for details on Taiwan's share of global output, see Chapter 3).
Innovation in Taiwan
Given the state-of-the-art facilities, large budget and highly skilled human
resources at its disposal, ITRI has been able to build a remarkable patent record.
Figure 4.2 shows ITRI's patents and inventions from 1987 to 2001, while Table 4.3
shows ITRI's patents in comparison with those awarded to high-tech companies in
Taiwan. ITRI has the most.
Fig. 4.2 ITRI's Patents and Inventions, 1987-2001
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Table 4.3 Top 10 recipients of US Patents for Taiwan, 1980-1996
Recipient Patent owner Number of Patents
Industrial technology research Institute (ITRI) G 602
United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC) G 317
National Science Council G 132
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. Ltd. (TSMC) G 89
Acer, Inc. 59
Winbound Electronics Corp. 25
IBM F 23
Honeywell Inc. F 21
Giftec Ltd. 21
Greenmaster, Industrial Corp. 20
G= government-owned
F= foreign-owned
Source: adapted from Amsden and Chu (2003)
Incubating New Firms
ITRI targets existing companies for joint R&D and also selects entrepreneurs for its
incubation facility, in its Open Lab. So far, 4,350 researchers have participated in
joint research from over 167 companies (Hsu, 2003). Currently there are 980
researchers from 50 companies onsite (ibid.). To date, 151 projects have been
conducted, with a total participating company investment of US$360 million (ibid.).
The incubator facility has been responsible for the formation of 96 new companies,
with a total capitalization of approximately US$1.2 billion (ibid.). ITRI's is believed to
be the world's most productive incubator (ibid.).
Human resource development in Taiwan
One of the most important services ITRI may have rendered Taiwan is in terms of its
human resource development. Through training, joint R&D and employment
provision, ITRI has trained nearly 16,000 Taiwanese in various industrial fields since
1973. Many of them have now moved on to various other institutions and
organizations (see Figure 4.3, below). ITRI served an immensely important role in the
1980s in helping to reverse the brain-drain from Taiwan (Lin, 1998). After finishing
post-graduate studies, many students tended to find jobs abroad, mostly in the US,
since opportunity in Taiwan was limited. ITRI, because of its early engagement with
cutting edge technology, provided many with a compelling reason to come back.
Several of the returning expatriates contributed immensely to development in
Taiwan upon their return.
Fig. 4.3 The Repository of Industrial Human Resources
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Working with Other Institutions in Taiwan
One of ITRI's most outstanding features is its collaborative work with state,
academic, and industrial actors. It has strong links with the Hsinchu Science-Based
Industrial Park, where firms move to after graduating from ITRI's incubation facility.
ITRI also has strong links with universities and national R&D centers, with whom it
collaborates in research. It works very closely with Taiwan's private sector, keeping a
close eye on industrial needs and future trends, and helping entrepreneurs establish
new business. Being directly under the MOEA, ITRI has profound state ties; its
operation is governed by various decisions and recommendations made a state level.
International Linkages
ITRI's close links with Taiwanese- and Chinese-Americans abroad have been
extremely useful in terms of technical advice, information on latest industrial trends,
and facilitation of technology transfer. The research links with scientists, engineers
and firms in California's Silicon Valley have been particularly useful. ITRI also has
partnerships with academic and industrial institutions worldwide. Currently, these
are in the US, Canada, Germany, UK, Netherlands, CIS, Israel, Japan, Korea and
Australia (Hsu, 2003). Further cultivation of worldwide partnerships is one of ITRI's
goals for the future.
Conclusions
This chapter has presented an overview of ITRI's functioning as well as an
assessment of how ITRI has contributed to Taiwan's development. It has done so
through upgrading traditional industry, exploring high-tech industry, launching
spin-off firms in semiconductor technology, helping entrepreneurs start new
business, doing collaborative research projects with academia and industry, and
contributing heavily to human resource development in the state in general.
The next chapter will show where ITRI fits within Taiwan's innovation system. It will
assess whether ITRI has been the chief institution that innovation in Taiwan hinges
upon. Importantly, it will also look at the feasibility of replicating an 'ITRI-approach'
in developing countries to promote economic development. The case of Pakistan is
briefly assessed in this regard.
5 DISCUSSION
Introduction
This chapter has two parts. First, it will assess ITRI's place within the Taiwanese
innovation system. This includes an examination of how crucial a role it played, both
directly and through its links with other institutions across sectors. The chapter also
looks at general lessons regarding high-tech development that can be learned from
this study, particularly as they relate to developing countries in their attempt to
'catch-up'. Secondly, the chapter takes a developing-country example, Pakistan, and
briefly overviews its institutional system and efforts to promote high-tech
development in order to see whether an ITRI-style approach can be of relevance and
use there. The example of Pakistan serves to highlight some prerequisites that may
be necessary in order for an ITRI-approach to work in developing countries, and
which factors can stand in the way of its success.
ITRI IN TAIWAN'S INNOVATION SYSTEM
The previous chapter looked at ITRI as an institute, and covered its origins,
departments, research areas, and accomplishments. This section will build upon that
information to focus on the issue of main interest: where does ITRI fit in the
Taiwanese innovation system? This requires an idea of the interworkings of the
various components of the system, and an assessment of the scope of ITRI within
these.
The Role of the Institute Within the N/S
Lin (2003) presented a national innovation system model that was reproduced in
Figures 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) in Chapter 2 (see p.19). Emphasizing that it was not merely
the components, but the relationships between them that define an innovation
system, he suggested that "the institute(s)" plays an important role in linking both
ends of the innovation process: research and commercialization (or academia and
industry). Just what role the institute plays in bridging the gap - the nature and
extent of the various functions it takes on - is a factor largely responsible in
distinguishing one country's system from another. Figure 5.1(a) reveals the various
functions that need to be carried out within a technological innovation system and
makes it clear that technological development institutes need to be a part of such a
system.
National Innovation Systems and the Role of the Institute
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In Figure 5.1 (b) Lin has modeled the innovation system of the United States. Both the
academic sector (universities) and the private sector (industries) are very strong, and
work closely with each other. Certain national institutes work to further bridge any
gap between the two.
Fig. 5.1b National Innovation System: USA
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ITRI in Taiwan's Innovation System
The difference in Taiwan's system, Lin (2003) claims, is that, traditionally, the gap
between universities and industry has been large. The "institute", ITRI in this case,
conducts research through its laboratories, and makes commercial products. It thus
plays the crucial role of filling in and bridging the gap between research and
commercialization, and works closely with state and industry (see Fig. 5.1(c)).
Further, ITRI has helped Taiwan establish indigenous technology capacity.
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The various functions served by ITRI and the relationships between the various
institutions involved in promoting high-tech R&D are displayed in the model in
Figure 5.2.
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As a large research and technology-implementation institute that addresses both
the government's development goals for the future and the needs - both current and
future - of Taiwan industry, ITRI has possessed the flexibility, the technical
expertise, and the domestic and international linkages required to play an
instrumental role in Taiwan's high-tech development, particularly electronics and IT.
Evidence has been presented thus far that ITRI:
. is a means for the Taiwan government to conduct R&D in 'strategic' high-technology
for the future;
* keeps apace with latest high-technological developments abroad, targets certain of
these to have brought into Taiwan, and conducts its own research on these for
adaptation and transferal to local industry;
. makes research results and advice on technology implementation procedures widely
available to domestic industry;
" helps entrepreneurs start new high-tech business through its incubator facility. These
then move to the Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park;
" provides training and education on high-tech development issues through
conferences, training programs, and joint research with other institutes;
* is a means of encouraging Taiwanese- and Chinese-American engineers and
scientists to return to Taiwan (by working at ITRI or the HSIP);
* has contributed greatly to Taiwan's highly skilled industrial research and professional
force by migration of its employees to industry;
. has spun-off at least two of Taiwan's most successful IT companies.
The question of great interest now is whether this highly successful institutional
approach can be of relevance to developing countries today to help them pursue
their technological development goals.
THE 'ITRI APPROACH' IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
As discussed in Chapter 2, many developing countries are in dire need of improving
their existing innovation systems, in order to push technological catch-up. A
continuing cycle of transfer of technology from industrialized countries will not be
sufficient to bridge the current gap between developed and developing countries,
nor may such an arrangement best meet the local industrial needs within developing
countries. Developing countries need to focus on technologies that can meet their
particular development goals, and develop the human capability and national
organizational structure to have these transferred, adapted and disseminated to
local industry - as Taiwan did. Developing countries will probably start of with
technology 'imitation', rather than 'innovation', but, as has been stated earlier, the
subset of skills required for imitation are a subset of those required for innovation.
Technological learning will require focused, incremental efforts, and the creation of
new skills and relationships. These concepts are in keeping with the new
'endogenous' approach towards innovation in developing countries.
Certain things stand out about Taiwan's ITRI-centered innovation system that have
important implications for developing countries:
- it is a streamlined system with easily identifiable components. There is little
room for replication of tasks within the system, except in the case where
various research institutes may be conducting cutting-edge research on the
same technological issues, which would, of course, be a desirable situation.
However, there is a strong tendency towards joint research. ITRI's role is
unique. Since it serves several crucial functions, this uniqueness is important
in allowing ITRI to function as a sole authority and in placing a high degree of
responsibility on the institute.
- The government has played a leading role in guiding Taiwan into certain
technological fields for development. Strong political leadership was crucial.
While the advisability of such levels of government involvement has been
debated by some, there are those who argue that in its initial stages of
technological development, at least, a strong government role is desirable for
a country. Technological development is necessarily a long-term goal; the
constancy and skilful planning with which a government pursues its goals are
factors that rest heavily on political stability within a country. This, Taiwan
was fortunate to have.
- Several authors have pointed at Taiwan's work ethic as a key factor in its
early success in development. The fact that the Taiwanese were educated,
hard-working and willing to learn speaks for the good educational programs
put in place by the government and a system of incentives for hard work - as
well as disincentives for slacking off.
- Taiwan utilized its capital and human resources efficiently. This ties in with
the establishment of only as many national institutions as the government
felt were necessary, and merging institutes to pool resources and prevent
replication of tasks.
Now a developing-country example is taken to see what kinds of changes would be
necessary for the Taiwanese, ITRI-based, innovation system to work - and whether
this would be desirable. The country examined is Pakistan. The next section will
outline the background of technological development in Pakistan, including positive
measures being taken and major hurdles that exist, and then an assessment of how
an ITRI-approach could be applied.
A MINI-CASE STUDY: INNOVATION IN PAKISTAN
Background
Pakistan, with a population of 153 million, of whom only 46 percent are literate
(UNDP, 2002), is a technologically backward country that has been - and still is -
heavily dependent on agriculture; this sector accounts for employment of 60 percent
of the country's labor force, and 25 percent of the GDP (Khan and lqbal, 2000). Most
of the country's exports are agriculture-related, notable exceptions being from the
surgical instruments and sports goods industries. Its domestic industry mostly
comprises small and medium highly labor-intensive enterprises, and foreign
investment has been low, although successive governments have constantly tried to
rectify this.
Pakistan has a per capita GDP of US$ 800 and is heavily dependent on foreign aid.
Education and health are sectors that have been largely neglected due to the
country's overriding security concerns, which have resulted in large proportions of
the budget being diverted for military purposes (US$2.6 billion in 2001; CSIS, 2002).
Although a large proportion of funds have been going into Pakistan's nuclear energy
program, other aspects of science and technology have been back-burner issues for
the country until very recently. A plethora of national research institutes and
university research departments were established, but were under-funded and
understaffed with qualified personnel. As one government researcher at the Pakistan
Council for Science and Industrial Research (PCSIR) said: "I left. It was impossible to
do any real research. We kept running out of chemicals for basic experiments" (pers.
comm., 2003). Pakistan only has 112 PhD-holders and engineers per 1 million of its
population (Ali, 2001). Most of the past ministers in Science & Technology have not
hailed from scientific backgrounds.
Institutional Structure of S&T System
Pakistan has a total of 130 research organizations working under different Federal
and Provincial Ministries in a variety of sectors. Fifty-eight of these function at the
federal level under as many as 12 ministries, conducting from basic research to
information dissemination. The various institutes under (MOST) are shown in Figure
5.3.
Fig. 5.3 R&D Institutes under the Ministry of Science and Technology
Source: based on ATIP (1 998)
Their functions range from giving MOST advice (PCST), to funding allocations (PSF),
to supporting other institutions involved in technology transfer (NCTT), to
conducting applied research (PCSIR, PCAT), etc.
However, there are also several other institutes doing related research working
under other ministries. For example, the Pakistan Industrial Technical Assistance
Center (PITAC) is under the Ministry for Industries, and conducts research on
environmentally-friendly technology for industry; the Central Telecommunication
Research Laboratories (CTRL) is under the Ministry of Communications; and space,
atomic, agricultural and environmental research is also carried out in institutes
Ministry of Science & Technology
Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR)
National Institute of Oceanography (NIO)
Pakistan Science Foundation (PSF)
Pakistan Science and Technology Assistance Center (PSTAC)
National Center for Technology Transfer (NCTT)
Pakistan Council of Science and Technology (PCST)
Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (PCSIR)
Pakistan Council of Appropriate Technology (PCAT)
National Institute of Electronics (NIE)
National Institute of Silicon Technology (NIST)
Council for Work and Housing Research (CWHR)
under different ministries. There is very little joint research between these various
institutes.
Efforts being made in S&T
Appointment of Minister with Science Background
For the first time, Pakistan's Federal Minister for Science and Technology, Prof.
Dr Atta-ur-Rahman, is highly qualified for the task, having taught Chemistry at
Cambridge University, UK, and currently heading the prestigious HEJ Institute
for Chemistry research in Pakistan. Appointed in 1999 by President Musharraf
after a military coup, Dr. Rahman has been making a tremendous effort to
boost S&T research in the country. The Ministry of Science and Technology has
made available a number of new fellowships and scholarships, is starting up
business incubators, and is heavily emphasizing IT development.
Focus on IT and human capacity building
Pakistan has a US$1 billion private sector telecom operation and IT industry.
For the first time in the country's history, Minister Dr. Rahman has formulated
an IT-development plan. The reason for choosing IT, according to the Minister
(Rahman, 2000), is that it requires less infrastructure investments and
sophisticated technologies than several other cutting-edge technologies. The
thrust is software development, and current areas of focus are service
industries such as data entry, call centers, and system integration. The IT
industry is facing several problems, however, which are discussed in the next
section.
President Musharraf allocated US$83 million for IT development for the period
2000-2003 to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and gave the
Minister free rein in its use. Most of these funds (60-70 percent), according to
the Minister (in Rizvi, 2003), are being used for human resource development.
The various IT-enhancement projects underway are:
* granting endowment funds to universities to facilitate higher education in IT;
e providing support to universities for capacity-building of IT departments (hiring
foreign-qualified faculty, training in-house faculty, etc.);
" starting projects to develop the local IT industry (local software development, helping
local companies prepare for international business, sponsoring and assisting local
companies in IT exhibitions, etc.);
e infrastructure development
. e-commerce studies.
IT institutes are being upgraded, and some are being accorded university status.
The government has also put several incentives for IT investment in place, such
as zero percent income tax for the next five years on software houses, zero
percent duty on computers and computer parts, the ability of software
companies to retain 35 percent of export earnings in foreign currency accounts,
fifty percent rebate on the income tax of IT professionals, and the easy
availability of loans for software houses (Rahman, 2000). A US$50 million
venture capital fund has been created by Pakistani IT professionals and
entrepreneurs based in the US. Foreign companies have also begun investing in
Pakistan, such as IBM, Oracle, CISCO and CERN, who are setting up training
centers and academies.
A new institute is being proposed for IT research in Islamabad, Pakistan: the
National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT). However, some criticism has
also been raised at the establishment of yet another institute (Professor
Daudpota, below).
Regional collaboration
Large efforts are being made in regional collaboration in S&T. One example is
the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) Standing Committee on Science and
Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH). The objective is to boost collective
scientific capacity through joint research, fellowships, training programs etc.
However, COMSTECH is severely hindered by funding shortages; its member
countries do not contribute enough for much progress to be made.
Problems Facing the ITSector
Although efforts are underway to address this, progress in Pakistan's IT sector has
been relatively stagnant over the past few years (unlike that of its neighbor India's).
An IT revolution in the country would greatly benefit both the public and private
sectors, providing many new jobs (including in supporting industries), more foreign
exchange in the country, and direct as well as indirect tax revenue for the
government.
Four areas need urgent attention (ibid.) for the IT sector to succeed30 :
- Education: currently, not enough equipment, scholarships, and the quality of
education provided in public institutes lags far behind that of private
institutes.
- Facilitate IT Businesses: The government has currently allowed one company,
PTCL, the monopoly over high-speed internet connections in the country,
and the rates it charges are very high. Competition needs to be introduced to
bring prices to affordable levels, or the government should subsidize
investment in this area. At present IT businesses are also subjected to a lot
of red tape, which dampens their motivation. Further, international training
courses and conferences are difficult for professionals to attend due to the
immense difficulties in procuring visas, which the government could attempt
to facilitate through legal agreements.
- Create Presence in International Markets: International market presence is
necessary for Pakistani companies to be able to compete effectively with
established companies from other countries. Since Pakistani companies have
very small budgets, they need to forge partnerships or joint venture
agreements with people or companies that already have a presence in the
international market. So far, these partnerships have been forged with
Pakistanis residing overseas. In an attempt to bring Pakistanis from both
continents to work together, President Musharraf had sent Mr. Toheed
Ahmad as Pakistan's IT Consul General to the Silicon valley in the US in 2002.
However, in less than 6 months, Mr. Ahmad had to close down operations,
due to economic circumstances in Pakistan, he claimed, particularly
withdrawal of foreign investment after events relating to September 11,
2001.
- Encourage Private Investment: Private investment, and not government
funding, is the main solution to the Pakistan IT industry's problems.
However, fraud, and fear of fraud, prevent people - even foreign-based
Pakistanis - from investing in Pakistan. A smooth legal framework to address
this needs to be created. Tax incentives for investors in IT would also be
helpful. Pakistanis overseas - who are the largest group of those investing in
30 These are mostly taken from Khan (2000).
Pakistan, are not very organized as a group where it comes to aiding Pakistan
- this needs to be changed. An important step was the organization of the
Overseas Strategic Advisory Board in San Francisco, USA, by the new Minister
for MOST.
Applying the ITRI Approach to Pakistan's IT Institutions
A number of IT research and educational institutes have been established in
Islamabad, Pakistan's capital city. Yet another has been proposed, the National
Institute for Information Technology (NIIT). The idea of combining these to form a
large R&D/implementation institute in the fashion of ITRI not only seems like a good
idea; it has been strongly recommended (without reference to ITRI) by one of
Pakistan's Professors in Business and Innovation at Hamdard University, Islamabad.
As Professor Daudpota (2000) brilliantly sums up:
"There are many ways to set up a new institution. The one usually followed in
Pakistan, particularly by the government functionaries, is to invest in mortar and
brick.. .The other, more rational approach.. .is to ensure that existing sparse
resources are optimized and used to the fullest.
"An important area where this second approach can work is in the setting up of a
national institute devoted to pursing information technology (IT). Run jointly by
the public and private sectors, this autonomous institution should (a) coordinate
national IT activities, (b) do research in areas of relevance to the country, (c) offer
accreditation to other IT-related institutions, (d) offer high level degrees and (e)
work closely with the Allama lqbal Open University (AIOU) to set up the Virtual
University.
"Many of the technological breakthroughs of the coming decades will result from
the synthesis of existing technologies, e.g. biotechnology and nano-technology.
IT is a prime example of this: it developed out of a synthesis of electronics,
communications and computer technologies.
"Institutions that specialize in each of these three areas can easily collaborate on
IT projects. ...the possibility arises for putting together an umbrella institution or
board that can make a national IT institution flourish there. At present there is
hardly any interaction between these institutions. Also, individually the
performance of these institutions is not great."
Professor Daupota suggests combining eight existing IT-related institutes that
are in close physical proximity to each other to form the NIIT. He warns:
"All this may seem overly ambitious and, given our past record of poor
management, an impractical idea. On the other hand, the alternative is the
continual lack of focus in these national institutes and a waste of resources. The
challenge is to tap these and to make a real difference in the IT arena."
Restructuring the system to a more ITRI-style approach, then, would yield
the following main benefits:
* more coherence in the system as various institutions are merged
* this will conserve funding and allow pooled human resources
* there will be more structure and organization within the system
Stumbling blocks: Problems in Pakistan's Innovation System
We have seen that some innovation analysts in Pakistan support the idea of the ITRI
approach towards innovation in IT in Pakistan. If this were done, then several of the
existing public R&D IT institutes, both under the Ministry for Science and Technology
and other government and entities, would be merged to form an institute with
pooled resources, financial and human. Further, since an organization of this size
would be able to give some solid help to industry in terms of research products and
advice, as well as technology transfer, private sector contributions to the institute
would expectedly be substantial. This section looks some "facts" of Pakistan's
innovation system that could thwart the desired functioning of the ITRI-approach.
Government
Pakistan's government has been changing every few years. Each new
government that came in represented a different political party, with its own
agenda. The result has been that all S&T policies and actions put in place by
one government would be undone by the next, sometimes out of a genuine
belief that things were not being done the right way, and sometimes just for
the sake of opposition. What is required is (i) either a national S&T that is not
so dependent on the whims of passing governments, or (ii) a government
that actually lasts for a certain period of time. President Musharraf claims
that his delay in stepping down as Pakistan's President comes from his desire
to lend stability to certain processes he has recently put in place.
Institutional
Pakistan has several national scientific research institutes, and is setting up
research centers at various universities. However, even at this basic research
level, equipment and facilities, as well as qualified personnel, are in short
supply due to funding constraints. Applied research is in even worse shape;
the Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (PSCIR), with
centers in various cities across the country, was formed with a view to
conducting applied research: determining the economic feasibility of various
products with a view to transferring them to industry. However, the institute
has failed. The main reason, according to Minister Dr. Rahman, is that less
than 0.3 percent of government funding to the institute was going into actual
research, with 99.7 percent going into the payment of utilities and salaries.
As a result, the number of PhD-holders working at the PCSIR has diminished
from 280 in the 1980s to 70 today - an utter collapse. However, merging
institutes could alleviate this situation, as well as that of universities.
Regarding national universities, Minister Rahman (in Rizvi, 2003) has stated
that their budget is, on average, only 20 percent of the amount that
universities in Bangladesh receive. PhD-holding manpower that has been
retiring over the past 10-15 years is not being replaced, so that universities
are faced with "a monumental crisis", and with the result that the universities
have "in many cases shrunk to the level of high schools" (ibid.).
Social
Apart from the fact that most of the population is illiterate and of those that
are literate, very few have higher-level qualifications in science and
technology, a big problem in R&D in Pakistan is providing people with the
incentive to conduct research and work hard. There is no adequate rewards
system; once a government-research position is procured by a person, the
job is more or less theirs until retirement. Since their work quality is scarcely
monitored, and those that do work hard are not given any rewards or
distinctions, there is actually a lot of incentive not to work hard. This is a
social as well as organizational issue.
Organization heads
Pakistan's government research institutes are characterized by weak
organizational leadership. In the case of Taiwan, it was seen that the
personal efforts of people such as Sun, Pan, and Chintay were instrumental in
making ITRI what it now is. Heads of government institutes lack motivation.
Further, in many cases there is a strong cultural tendency to help friends and
extended family members with appointments and benefits, rather than follow
a strictly merit-based approach.
Educational
Schools are under-funded and it is difficult to obtain qualified teachers who
will work for the salaries offered by government schools. Educational reforms
are being put in place, however. Many of Pakistan's poorer children have
traditionally studied at 'madrassas', where education was entirely on
religious topics, in exchange for free shelter, clothing, and food for the
children. President Musharraf recently made the study of science and
mathematics compulsory at such schools, and also made university
qualifications compulsory for electoral candidates (many representatives
from religious parties tended to only hold qualifications from the 'madrasses'
formerly). Positive changes are being seen here.
Economic
Attracting foreign investment has always been a goal of the various
governments of Pakistan. However, due to unstable circumstances
domestically (crime, unstable market, etc.), this has not been going well.
Progress plummeted even further after September 11, 2001, with many
foreign companies pulling out. Pakistan's domestic industry is upset about
plans to increase tax revenues by raising taxes.
Conclusions from the Pakistan Assessment
* An ITRI type of approach towards merging R&D institutes can be of use in
Pakistan. There is an over-abundance of IT institutes, and they are not
performing very well individually.
* At present, the scope of such an ITRI-type institute would primarily be IT
research, since manufacture is not really taking place. However, IT service
provision is an industrial aspect that such an institute could help with.
. Several factors stand in the way of an ITRI-approach working as it should, at
present, However, all these factors are such that they need to be gotten rid of
regardless of the innovation approach adopted.
The Funding Question
While the ITRI-approach towards high-tech development could play an
extremely useful role in developing countries such as Pakistan, there will
always be the question of how to mobilize capital for such a system. Taiwan,
through prior well-planned economic and industrial policies, was not in the
cash-strapped position that many developing countries are in today. For a
large-scale institute to be set up that requires substantial government
funding, therefore, funding is an issue of primary concern.
Developing countries that wish to follow the institutional approach of ITRI
need not follow Taiwan's system of funding it, however. There are a number
of options they could come up with, using combinations of various types of
funding, for example through a regional collaborative system, the help of
foreign enterprises, or by diverting funds from national universities and
research institutes who could work along with the larger one instead.
The main point here is that consolidation of institutes, as would
automatically occur through this approach, creates efficiencies. Instead of
dividing funds into several small doses for a number of institutes conducting
similar research, it would be far more advantageous to combine institutes
and accord the super-institute a large sum. It is a question of the
government's commitment to such a system - and to the promotion of its
chosen high-technology - that will be the deciding factors in the success of
this approach.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TAIWAN'S EXPERIENCE WITH ITRI
1. SCALE of the institute is important
Institutes are important in bridging gaps between academia and industry, and scale
matters very much. ITRI owes its size to the merging of at least 3 institutes at the
time of its creation. It has constantly been expanded since then.
Taiwan's SMEs, though agile and flexible, would not have been able to succeed
without the research and technical support that ITRI offered them through joint
research, technological adaptation and transfer, dissemination of research results in
fast-paced tech fields, and incubation services. The SMEs simply did not have the
capital and human resources to accomplish all this on their own. ITRI has state-of-
the-art equipment, keeps track of latest technologies through international contacts
and linkages, and receives half of its funding nearly US$500 million in 2000, from
the government. Such a huge organization was a necessity for the Taiwanese
industry. The scale was further expanded by situating the Hsinchu Science-based
Industrial Park in the vicinity. Similarly, ITRI's new campus in southern Taiwan has
been constructed in Tainan, the same locale as the Tainan Science Park, again to
create the advantages of scale and proximity of industrial research centers.
2. TIMING is important
Developing countries do not have to retrace all the same steps that industrialized
countries took; jumping ahead and cutting in at an advanced stage in the race has
worked, for instance, for Taiwan, where the government displayed keen acumen in
taking the country in the "right" high-tech direction. One of the factors that is very
important in ensuring a successful outcome of being 'state-steered' in high-tech is
if the government knows when to cut in.
This has been nicely explained by Evans (1986)31, in his claim that there are
"moments of transition" when it may be possible for a Third World country to break
into an existing industry. At these moments, "the interests of local capital are still
undefined and international capital may be caught off balance" (p. 805). However, he
states, taking advantage of such moments requires a pre-existing infrastructure
31 In Meaney (1994).
and organizational capacities (or, I might add, a quickly-modified one, as in
Taiwan's case) and regime commitment to development.
Similarly, with Taiwan facing a different situation today than it did 30 years ago,
timing is still important, but in a different and more pressing way. The need for
Taiwan to produce higher value-added technological products is immense, and in
order to really move ahead, it needs to do fast-paced, cutting-edge research in
latest high-tech fields, for example, nano-technology. Since Taiwan's government
has decided that Taiwan now needs to be a leading global innovator, rather than
manufacturer, it needs to jump in at the same time as advanced countries. Hence the
strong attention being paid to nanotechnology at ITRI these days.
3. CHOICE OF SECTOR is important
This concept ties in to an extent with the preceding one of timing, in that when to
make the leap into high-technology depends upon which kid of high-technology is
being talked about. However, what is important to emphasize here is that a sector
that will work for one country will not necessarily work for another. The academic
bent of its work force, the needs of local industry and the local population, and the
pre-existing institutional structure (including regional and international research
links) are all extremely important considerations in deciding which form of high-
tech development to pursue. In the 1 970s, for instance, given the rise of global
electronic firms, the fact that engineering was a preferred academic discipline in
Taiwan, and Taiwan's cheap labor, electronics and IT may have seemed the best
option. Given the resource needs of its population, the pursuit of biotechnology may
have been the obvious sectoral choice for Kenya today - probably building upon
existing agricultural institutional foundations. Deciding which sector to invest in is
an important, weighty decision to make, with long-term repercussions.
4. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP is important
Taiwan had strong political leadership backing its drive towards high-tech
development. The fact that the government was strong and stable and took active
interest in technological development meant that strong decisions could be taken,
even if not necessarily favorable with all entities that would be affected. Since
government usually plays a strong role in technical development in developing
countries - at least in the early stages, it is important that it be able to take a firm
stand and persist with its goals. Also, there should be some continuity in its course
of action. As was seen in the case of Pakistan, rapidly changing governments with
differing priorities have prevented stable high-tech growth from occurring.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents the main conclusions of the study, as well as some policy and
research implications.
CONCLUSIONS
1) The fact that the Taiwanese government consolidated several different
research institutions into a single one to create ITRI gave rise to a scale at
which R&D could be conducted effectively and efficiently.
2) It has been said by some authors that Taiwan is a striking example of an
SME-based country that has managed to achieve high-technological and
economic success. This thesis argues that this was possible chiefly because
at the core of the country's innovation system lies a large R&D institute.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Many developing countries (e.g., Pakistan) have set up a large number of research
institutes as a testament to their commitment to S&T research. Often, these are set
up on a stand-alone basis (or to report directly to one other higher authority)
without a clear idea of how they will inter-link with existing institutes. Often,
existing institutes are doing very nearly the same thing, or functions that could
easily be carried out by another existing institute. Or they may be doing related
research but are so short of funds that they are not fulfilling their intended goals. As
such, these institutes are doing little to facilitate R&D and innovation in the country.
In fact, by scattering funds so that little can be achieved at any individual institute,
they are almost a hindrance rather than a help. This is unfortunate, since institutions
are known to play a key role in a country's innovation system, particularly where the
gap between industry and academia is large.
Policy Implication No. 1
These institutes need to be merged in order to make the
most of available funds and personnel, and to reap
economies of scale.
Developing countries today are trying to figure out how they can jump into high
technological development in their efforts to catch up with the industrialized world.
High-tech development in even a single sector is a long-term, highly capital-
intensive process that requires long-term planning, and re-structuring and
strengthening of the national innovation system. Also, developments in high-tech
tend to occur in sudden spurts that can be quite rapid; the possibility of getting left
behind is all too easy. In the case of Taiwan, much deliberation was done before
selecting electronics (ICs) for development, and the decision was based on the fact
that international and domestic conditions were right at the time. In developing
countries, the state usually decides which high technology to pursue (although as
development proceeds, its role tends to grow less relative to industry). Regarding
the early stages of state intervention, then, the following points are crucial:
Policy Implications No. 2 and No. 3
e Timing of intervention in a particular technology is
important
e Choice of sector is important
Both the above factors depend on a number of factors internal and external to the
country.
Also important to note with regard to government interventions is the fact that
political leadership can and does play a critical role in determining the success of a
plan to move towards developing a particular high-technology. Political leadership
certainly was a factor in Taiwan's success. Also, lack of common long-term
development goals for Pakistan's various political leaders has been a factor in its
lack of development, and that of some other developing countries.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
This study contributes to the larger body of literature on the role of institutions in
national innovation systems of developing countries by explaining the need for
large-scale research institutes. Large-scale, government-supported institutes have
an immense role to play in SME-dominated economies, particularly developing
economies. This thesis offers a theory on how Taiwan achieved its technological
success despite its predominance of SM Es.
Regarding further research:
. It would be interesting to examine other successful national cases involving
large-scale government-supported research institutes, in order to come up
with generalized lessons.
. It would be particularly useful to study instances of current developing
countries that have tried to do this by consolidation of research institutes,
and with what results.
. Further, in-depth study of ITRI itself would also be highly desirable, since
this study could not go in much depth into all its various functions and
research linkages.
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